Cyber vaccines and antibodies

ABSTRACT

Provided are systems, methods, and computer program products for a cyber-vaccination technique. In various implementations, the technique includes determine characteristics of a testing environment. A testing environment can be used to analyze malware programs. The technique can further include configuring a production network device with the characteristics, so that the production network device resembles the testing environment. The production network device is used for network operations, which excludes analyzing malware programs.

CROSS REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/467,276 filed on Mar. 23, 2017, which claims the benefit of andpriority to Indian Provisional Application Number 201741001265, filed onJan. 12, 2017. Each of the preceding is incorporated herein by referencein their entirety.

BRIEF SUMMARY

Cyber-vaccination and cyber antibodies borrow concepts known inmedicine. In medicine, a vaccine often uses a weakened or killedorganism to stimulate the human body to create antibodies against theorganism. Similarly, in the realm of computing, the tools used bymalware programs can be used against the very same malware programs todefend computing systems from being infected by these malware programs.

Provided are systems, methods, including computer-implemented methods,and computer-program products for a cyber-vaccination technique. Invarious implementations, the cyber-vaccination technique includes usinga network device that is infected by a malware program to determining amarker generated by the malware program. The marker may indicate to themalware program that the network device has been infected by the malwareprogram. Determining the marker can include identifying a placement ofthe marker on the network device. The technique further includesidentifying one or more other network devices that have not previouslybeen infected by the malware program. The technique further includesautomatically distributing copies of the marker. When a copy of themarker is received at one of the previously identified, uninfectednetwork devices, the identified network device can place the marker onthe identified network device according to the identified placement.

In various implementations, determining the marker according to thecyber-vaccination technique includes comparing a first snapshot of theinfected network device with a second snapshot of the infected networkdevice. The first snapshot was taken before the infection by the malwareprogram occurred, and the second snapshot was taken after the infectionoccurred. Determining the marker further includes determining one ormore differences between the first snapshot and the second snapshot, andidentifying a difference from the among the differences as the marker.

In some implementations, determining the marker includes determining achange in a system registry of the network device. In someimplementations, determining the marker includes determining a change ina file system of the network device. In some implementations,determining the marker includes identifying a process running on thenetwork device. In some implementations, determining the marker includesidentifying a user logged in to the network device. In someimplementations, determining the marker includes determining a change ina system memory of the network device. In some implementations,determining the marker includes identifying an open port of the networkdevice.

In various implementations, the cyber-vaccination technique furtherincludes identifying the network device as infected by the malwareprogram. In various implementations, the technique further includesactivating the malware program on the network device.

In various implementations, presence of a copy of the marker on anuninfected network device from the one or more other network devicesrepresents the network device as infected by the malware program.

In various implementations, determining the marker occurs in real time.

In various implementations, automatically distributing the copies of themarker includes using a remote administration tool.

Also provided are systems, methods, and computer-program products for acyber-antibody technique. In various implementations, the cyber-antibodytechnique includes using a network device that has been infected with anunknown malware program to monitor packets sent by this network deviceonto a network. The technique further includes identifying a packet thatis associated with the unknown malware program. The packet can beidentified from among the monitored packets, and identifying the packetcan include determining a characteristic of the packet. The techniquefurther includes identifying other packets having a characteristicsimilar to the characteristic of the identified packet. The techniquefurther includes inserting data associated with a known malware programinto the one or more other packets. The technique further includesautomatically distributing the characteristic of the packet. When thecharacteristic is received at another network device, the characteristiccan be used to identify additional packets having a characteristicsimilar to the characteristic of the packet.

In various implementations, in accordance with the cyber antibodytechnique, identifying the packet associated with the malware programincludes determining a process that generated the packet.

In various implementations, determining the characteristic of the packetincludes examining a header portion of the packet. In someimplementations, examining the header portion includes identifying oneor more of a source address, a destination address. a network servicetype, an identifier, a class, or a label.

In various implementations, determining the characteristic of the packetincludes examining a payload portion of the packet. In someimplementations, examining the payload portion includes identifying fora character string.

In various implementations, the data associated with the known malwareprogram infects the one or more other packets with the known malwareprogram. In some implementations, the known malware program is blockedby network security infrastructure devices.

In various implementations, monitoring the packets includes monitoringfor minutes, hours, days, or weeks.

In various implementations, the cyber-antibody technique furtherincludes receiving a new characteristic from the network. The newcharacteristic may be associated with a new malware program. Thetechnique further includes configuring a process with the newcharacteristic. The process can insert the digital signature in otherpackets with a similar characteristic.

In various implementations, identifying the packet occurs in real time.

In various implementations, automatically distributing thecharacteristic includes using remote administration tools.

Also provided are systems, methods, and computer-program products for ageneric cyber-vaccination technique. In various implementations, thegeneric cyber-vaccination technique includes using a network device todetermine one or more characteristics of a testing environment. Thetesting environment can used to analyze malware programs. The techniquefurther includes configuring a production network device used in networkoperations, which exclude analyzing malware programs. The productionnetwork device can configured using the characteristics of the testingenvironment. Configuring the production network device with thecharacteristics can cause the production network device to resemble thetesting environment.

In various implementations, the testing environment involved in thegeneric cyber-vaccination technique includes a virtual machine. Invarious implementations, the one or more characteristics of the testingenvironment include a process associated with a virtual machine. Invarious implementations, the characteristics include a particular MediaAccess Control (MAC) address. In various implementations,characteristics include an entry in a system registry. In variousimplementations, the characteristics include one or more of a structureor content of a file system. In various implementations, thecharacteristics include an execution path of a process associated withthe testing environment.

In various implementations, the generic cyber-vaccination techniqueincludes automatically distributing the characteristics of the testingenvironment to one or more other network devices.

In various implementations, the generic cyber-vaccination techniqueincludes configuring the network device with the one or morecharacteristics.

In various implementations, the generic cyber-vaccination techniqueincludes receiving a malware program. The malware program may beconfigured to execute upon determining that the malware program is notin the testing environment.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Illustrative embodiments are described in detail below with reference tothe following figures:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysissystem, in which various implementations of a deception-based securitysystem can be used;

FIGS. 2A-2D provide examples of different installation configurationsthat can be used for different customer networks;

FIG. 3A-3B illustrate examples of customer networks where some of thecustomer networks' network infrastructure is “in the cloud,” that is, isprovided by a cloud services provider;

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of an enterprise network;

FIG. 5 illustrates a general example of an Internet-of-Things network;

FIG. 6 illustrates an example of an Internet-of-Things network, hereimplemented in a private home;

FIG. 7 illustrates an Internet-of-Things network, here implemented in asmall business;

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrialcontrol system;

FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a SCADA system, here used fordistributed monitoring and control;

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a distributed control;

FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a PLC implemented in a manufacturingcontrol process;

FIGS. 12A-12C illustrate an example of a network, in which cybervaccination techniques can be implemented;

FIG. 13 illustrates another example of a network in which cybervaccination techniques can be implemented;

FIGS. 14A-14C illustrate an example of a network, in which cyberantibody techniques can be implemented;

FIG. 15 illustrates another example of a network in which cyber antibodytechniques can be implemented;

FIG. 16 illustrates an example of a network that includes a sandboxtesting environment; and

FIG. 17 illustrates an example of a generic cyber vaccination technique.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Network deception mechanisms, often referred to as “honeypots,” “honeytokens,” and “honey nets,” among others, defend a network from threatsby distracting or diverting the threat. Honeypot-type deceptionmechanisms can be installed in a network for a particular site, such asa business office, to act as decoys in the site's network. Honeypot-typedeception mechanisms are typically configured to be indistinguishablefrom active, production systems in the network. Additionally, suchdeception mechanisms are typically configured to be attractive to anetwork threat by having seemingly valuable data and/or by appearingvulnerable to infiltration. Though these deception mechanisms can beindistinguishable from legitimate parts of the site network, deceptionmechanisms are not part of the normal operation of the network, andwould not be accessed during normal, legitimate use of the site network.Because normal users of the site network would not normally use oraccess a deception mechanism, any use or access to the deceptionmechanism is suspected to be a threat to the network.

“Normal” operation of a network generally includes network activity thatconforms with the intended purpose of a network. For example, normal orlegitimate network activity can include the operation of a business,medical facility, government office, education institution, or theordinary network activity of a private home. Normal network activity canalso include the non-business-related, casual activity of users of anetwork, such as accessing personal email and visiting websites onpersonal time, or using network resources for personal use. Normalactivity can also include the operations of network security devices,such as firewalls, anti-virus tools, intrusion detection systems,intrusion protection systems, email filters, adware blockers, and so on.Normal operations, however, exclude deceptions mechanisms, in thatdeception mechanisms are not intended to take part in businessoperations or casual use. As such, network users and network systems donot normally access deceptions mechanisms except perhaps for the mostroutine network administrative tasks. Access to a deception mechanism,other than entirely routine network administration, may thus indicate athreat to the network.

Threats to a network can include active attacks, where an attackerinteracts or engages with systems in the network to steal information ordo harm to the network. An attacker may be a person, or may be anautomated system. Examples of active attacks include denial of service(DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, spoofingattacks, “man-in-the-middle” attacks, attacks involving malformednetwork requests (e.g. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning,“ping of death,” etc.), buffer, heap, or stack overflow attacks, andformat string attacks, among others. Threats to a network can alsoinclude self-driven, self-replicating, and/or self-triggering malicioussoftware. Malicious software can appear innocuous until activated, uponwhich the malicious software may attempt to steal information from anetwork and/or do harm to the network. Malicious software is typicallydesigned to spread itself to other systems in a network. Examples ofmalicious software include ransomware, viruses, worms, Trojan horses,spyware, keyloggers, rootkits, and rogue security software, amongothers.

Anti-virus tools and so-called “sandbox” techniques can be used todetect and block malware, including for example ransomware, adware,bots, rootkits, spyware, Trojan horses, viruses, worms, and other typesof malicious programs. Anti-virus tools include those produced byMcAfee®, Kaspersky®, and Symantec®, among others. Sandbox techniques fordetecting and blocking malware typically use a tightly controlled andclosely monitored environment, referred to as a sandbox or testingenvironment, in which untrusted programs can be run and watched. Becausethe testing environment is carefully controlled and isolated, any harmdone by the untrusted program will not spread to other computingsystems. Sandbox testing environments are frequently virtualenvironments, which can be quickly reset to a clean state when testingis complete. Sandbox environments include those produced by FireEye®,among others.

Sandbox techniques and similar techniques are frequently used to analyzenewly discovered malware. A malware program can be released into thesandbox, where the malware program can be studied and/or reverseengineered by security experts. Reverse engineering the malware caninclude determining the manner in which the malware operates, the harmintended by the malware, the manner in which the malware replicatesitself, and/or identifying the point of entry of the malware into anetwork or computing system. Security engineers can generate a digitalsignature for the malware, for example by executing a program orfunction on data associated with the malware (e.g., a file, a file name,a process, a network packets, etc.). For example, the digital signaturecan be generated by executing a hash function on an executable file fromwhich the malware program was launched. As used herein, the digitalsignature is typically a unique identifier for a specific malwareprogram and can be used to identify the malware when, for example,anti-virus tools scan computer data.

Reverse engineering and producing digital signatures for each newmalware program and each new variant of a malware program may not bepossible or practicable. For example, 350,000 ransomware variants werereleased in just 2015. Furthermore, while digital signatures can be usedto contain malware outbreaks, malware designers have been able to thwartidentification through digital signatures. For example, some malwarehave been written as oligomorphic, polymorphic, or metamorphic programs,which can encrypt parts of themselves, or otherwise modify themselves.These techniques can disguise the malware, so that the malware will notmatch a digital signature in a block list.

Digital signatures also cannot defend against a “zero day” virus ormalware. A zero day virus or malware is a previously unknown maliciousprogram, for which a digital signature is not yet available. Anti-virustools and other network security infrastructure may not be able toidentify and block zero-day malware.

Security experts have developed other approaches for identifying malwarethat do not rely exclusively on digital signatures. For example, somenetwork security products use behavioral detection techniques, heuristicdetection techniques, artificial intelligence, machine learning,containerization, and sandbox testing environments, among other things.Challenges faced by these approaches include filtering out of falsepositives, convenience of configuration for ordinary users (e.g.,non-security experts), and false negatives, that is, failing to detector identify a malware program.

Once malware has been detected, a typical incident response is tomanually isolate the compromised computing system. For example, thecomputing system can be shut down or the computing system's networkaccess can be disabled. By isolating the compromised computing system,network administrators can attempt to prevent or limit the spread of themalware to other devices in the network. Such manual intervention,however, relies on the vigilance, speed, and skill of human operators,who may not be able to keep up with the sheer volume of malware attacks.Isolation of compromised computing systems can be accomplished in anautomated fashion, but automated isolation relies on the ability oftools that can detect that the system has been compromised. Such toolsmay have varying degrees of capability.

In various implementations, provided are techniques for “vaccinating” acomputing system against a malware attack, without needing to reverseengineer the malware program, or otherwise expend much effort analyzingthe malware program. In various implementations, a cyber-vaccinetechnique includes determining a marker generated by the malwareprogram. Malware programs often avoid re-infecting a system twice, andso use various markers, such as files, processes, registry entries, andother data to identify systems the malware program has already infected.

Cyber-vaccination techniques can be used to identify such markers. Onceidentified, the markers can be distributed to other computing systems,including ones not yet infected by the malware. Should the malwarespread to these computing systems, the malware may detect the marker,and not infect these computing systems. Computing systems can thus beprotected from infection.

In various implementations, also provided are techniques for providingcomputing systems with “antibodies” against malware attacks that useseemingly innocuous network communications to receive instructions froma malicious entity and/or to steal data. In some cases, malware programsestablish “command and control” communication channels with entitiesoutside of a local area network, such as somewhere on the Internet.Using a command and control channel the malware can receive instructionsand/or send valuable data to the outside entity. The networkcommunications with the outside entity can appear safe and innocent. Forexample, the communications can be social media posts, forum posts,and/or other network communications that, alone, may do no harm.

Cyber-antibody techniques can be used to identify such network traffic.Once identified, this seemingly harmless network traffic can bedeliberately “tainted” or made to carry a known malware signature. Thenetwork traffic thus appears to contain malware, and because knownmalware is used, a network's security infrastructure will block thenetwork traffic from reaching the Internet. The malware's command andcontrol channel can thus be cut off, possibly preventing the malwarefrom doing harm. The cyber-antibody can further be distributed to thecomputing systems in a network, so that, should these systems becomeinfected with the same malware, the malware will be unable to establisha command and control communication channel. These computing systems canthus be protected from this particular malware.

In various implementations, also provided are techniques for providing ageneric cyber-vaccine for computing systems in a network. As notedabove, malware programs are sometimes designed to detect when themalware program is in a sandbox testing environment. For example, amalware program may look for the presence of particular processes orfiles. A generic cyber-vaccine can replicate the characteristics of atesting environment on production systems, such that productionssystems—which would not be used for analyzing malware—resemble a testingenvironment. Malware programs designed not to trigger in a testingenvironment may thus not trigger on computing systems that have thegeneric cyber-vaccine. In this way, these computing systems can beprotected from infection that are capable of detecting theirenvironment.

I. Deception-Based Security Systems

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysissystem 100, in which various implementations of a deception-basedsecurity system can be used. The network threat detection and analysissystem 100, or, more briefly, network security system 100, providessecurity for a site network 104 using deceptive security mechanisms, avariety of which may be called “honeypots.” The deceptive securitymechanisms may be controlled by and inserted into the site network 104using a deception center 108 and sensors 110, which may also be referredto as deception sensors, installed in the site network 104. In someimplementations, the deception center 108 and the sensors 110 interactwith a security services provider 106 located outside of the sitenetwork 104. The deception center 108 may also obtain or exchange datawith sources located on the Internet 150.

Security mechanisms designed to deceive, sometimes referred to as“honeypots,” may also be used as traps to divert and/or deflectunauthorized use of a network away from the real network assets. Adeception-based security mechanism may be a computer attached to thenetwork, a process running on one or more network systems, and/or someother device connected to the network. A security mechanism may beconfigured to offer services, real or emulated, to serve as bait for anattack on the network. Deception-based security mechanisms that take theform of data, which may be called “honey tokens,” may be mixed in withreal data in devices in the network. Alternatively or additionally,emulated data may also be provided by emulated systems or services.

Deceptive security mechanisms can also be used to detect an attack onthe network. Deceptive security mechanisms are generally configured toappear as if they are legitimate parts of a network. These securitymechanisms, however, are not, in fact, part of the normal operation ofthe network. Consequently, normal activity on the network is not likelyto access the security mechanisms. Thus any access over the network tothe security mechanism is automatically suspect.

The network security system 100 may deploy deceptive security mechanismsin a targeted and dynamic fashion. Using the deception center 108 thesystem 100 can scan the site network 104 and determine the topology ofthe site network 104. The deception center 108 may then determinedevices to emulate with security mechanisms, including the type andbehavior of the device. The security mechanisms may be selected andconfigured specifically to attract the attention of network attackers.The security mechanisms may also be selected and deployed based onsuspicious activity in the network. Security mechanisms may be deployed,removed, modified, or replaced in response to activity in the network,to divert and isolate network activity related to an apparent attack,and to confirm that the network activity is, in fact, part of a realattack.

The site network 104 is a network that may be installed among thebuildings of a large business, in the office of a small business, at aschool campus, at a hospital, at a government facility, or in a privatehome. The site network 104 may be described as a local area network(LAN) or a group of LANS. The site network 104 may be one site belongingto an organization that has multiple site networks 104 in one or manygeographical locations. In some implementations, the deception center108 may provide network security to one site network 104, or to multiplesite networks 104 belonging to the same entity.

The site network 104 is where the networking devices and users of the anorganizations network may be found. The site network 104 may includenetwork infrastructure devices, such as routers, switches hubs,repeaters, wireless base stations, and/or network controllers, amongothers. The site network 104 may also include computing systems, such asservers, desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, personaldigital assistants, and smart phones, among others. The site network 104may also include other analog and digital electronics that have networkinterfaces, such as televisions, entertainment systems, thermostats,refrigerators, and so on.

The deception center 108 provides network security for the site network104 (or multiple site networks for the same organization) by deployingsecurity mechanisms into the site network 104, monitoring the sitenetwork 104 through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirectingapparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from theapparent threat. To provide security for the site network 104, invarious implementations the deception center 108 may communicate withsensors 110 installed in the site network 104, using network tunnels120. As described further below, the tunnels 120 may allow the deceptioncenter 108 to be located in a different sub-network (“subnet”) than thesite network 104, on a different network, or remote from the sitenetwork 104, with intermediate networks (possibly including the Internet150) between the deception center 108 and the site network 104.

In some implementations, the network security system 100 includes asecurity services provider 106. In these implementations, the securityservices provider 106 may act as a central hub for providing security tomultiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled bydifferent organizations. For example, the security services provider 106may communicate with multiple deception centers 108 that each providesecurity for a different site network 104 for the same organization. Insome implementations, the security services provider 106 is locatedoutside the site network 104. In some implementations, the securityservices provider 106 is controlled by a different entity than theentity that controls the site network. For example, the securityservices provider 106 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations,the security services provider 106 is controlled by the same entity asthat controls the site network 104.

In some implementations, when the network security system 100 includes asecurity services provider 106, the sensors 110 and the deception center108 may communicate with the security services provider 106 in order tobe connected to each other. For example, the sensors 110, which may alsobe referred to as deception sensors, may, upon powering on in the sitenetwork 104, send information over a network connection 112 to thesecurity services provider 106, identifying themselves and the sitenetwork 104 in which they are located. The security services provider106 may further identify a corresponding deception center 108 for thesite network 104. The security services provider 106 may then providethe network location of the deception center 108 to the sensors 110, andmay provide the deception center 108 with the network location of thesensors 110. A network location may take the form of, for example, anInternet Protocol (IP) address. With this information, the deceptioncenter 108 and the sensors 110 may be able to configure tunnels 120 tocommunicate with each other.

In some implementations, the network security system 100 does notinclude a security services provider 106. In these implementations, thesensors 110 and the deception center 108 may be configured to locateeach other by, for example, sending packets that each can recognize ascoming for the other. Using these packets, the sensors 110 and deceptioncenter 108 may be able to learn their respective locations on thenetwork. Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator canconfigure the sensors 110 with the network location of the deceptioncenter 108, and vice versa.

In various implementations, the sensors 110 are a minimal combination ofhardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection withthe site network 104 and a tunnel 120 with the deception center 108. Forexample, a sensor 110 may be constructed using a low-power processor, anetwork interface, and a simple operating system. In variousimplementations, the sensors 110 provide the deception center 108 withvisibility into the site network 104, such as for example being able tooperate as a node in the site network 104, and/or being able to presentor project deceptive security mechanisms into the site network 104, asdescribed further below. Additionally, in various implementations, thesensors 110 may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on thesite network 104 can be redirected to the deception center 108, as isalso described below.

In various implementations, the deception center 108 may be configuredto profile the site network 104, deploy deceptive security mechanismsfor the site network 104, detect suspected threats to the site network104, analyze the suspected threat, and analyze the site network 104 forexposure and/or vulnerability to the supposed threat.

To provide the site network 104, the deception center 108 may include adeception profiler 130. In various implementations, the deceptionprofiler may 130 derive information 114 from the site network 104, anddetermine, for example, the topology of the site network 104, thenetwork devices included in the site network 104, the software and/orhardware configuration of each network device, and/or how the network isused at any given time. Using this information, the deception profiler130 may determine one or more deceptive security mechanisms to deployinto the site network 104.

In various implementations, the deception profiler may configure anemulated network 116 to emulate one or more computing systems. Using thetunnels 120 and sensors 110, the emulated computing systems may beprojected into the site network 104, where they serve as deceptions. Theemulated computing systems may include address deceptions,low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. In someimplementations, the emulated computing systems may be configured toresemble a portion of the network. In these implementations, thisnetwork portion may then be projected into the site network 104.

In various implementations, a network threat detection engine 140 maymonitor activity in the emulated network 116, and look for attacks onthe site network 104. For example, the network threat detection engine140 may look for unexpected access to the emulated computing systems inthe emulated network 116. The network threat detection engine 140 mayalso use information 114 extracted from the site network 104 to adjustthe emulated network 116, in order to make the deceptions moreattractive to an attack, and/or in response to network activity thatappears to be an attack. Should the network threat detection engine 140determine that an attack may be taking place, the network threatdetection engine 140 may cause network activity related to the attack tobe redirected to and contained within the emulated network 116.

In various implementations, the emulated network 116 is aself-contained, isolated, and closely monitored network, in whichsuspect network activity may be allowed to freely interact with emulatedcomputing systems. In various implementations, questionable emails,files, and/or links may be released into the emulated network 116 toconfirm that they are malicious, and/or to see what effect they have.Outside actors can also be allowed to access emulated system, steal dataand user credentials, download malware, and conduct any other maliciousactivity. In this way, the emulated network 116 not only isolated asuspected attack from the site network 104, but can also be used tocapture information about an attack. Any activity caused by suspectnetwork activity may be captured in, for example, a history of sent andreceived network packets, log files, and memory snapshots.

In various implementations, activity captured in the emulated network116 may be analyzed using a targeted threat analysis engine 160. Thethreat analysis engine 160 may examine data collected in the emulatednetwork 116 and reconstruct the course of an attack. For example, thethreat analysis engine 160 may correlate various events seen during thecourse of an apparent attack, including both malicious and innocuousevents, and determine how an attacker infiltrated and caused harm in theemulated network 116. In some cases, the threat analysis engine 160 mayuse threat intelligence 152 from the Internet 150 to identify and/oranalyze an attack contained in the emulated network 116. The threatanalysis engine 160 may also confirm that suspect network activity wasnot an attack. The threat analysis engine 160 may produce indicatorsthat describe the suspect network activity, including indicating whetherthe suspect activity was or was not an actual threat. The threatanalysis engine 160 may share these indicators with the securitycommunity 180, so that other networks can be defended from the attack.The threat analysis engine 160 may also send the indicators to thesecurity services provider 106, so that the security services provider106 can use the indicators to defend other site networks.

In various implementations, the threat analysis engine 160 may also sendthreat indicators, or similar data, to a behavioral analytics engine170. The behavioral analytics engine 170 may be configured to use theindicators to probe 118 the site network 104, and see whether the sitenetwork 104 has been exposed to the attack, or is vulnerable to theattack. For example, the behavioral analytics engine 170 may search thesite network 104 for computing systems that resemble emulated computingsystems in the emulated network 116 that were affected by the attack. Insome implementations, the behavioral analytics engine 170 can alsorepair systems affected by the attack, or identify these systems to anetwork administrator. In some implementations, the behavioral analyticsengine 170 can also reconfigure the site network's 104 securityinfrastructure to defend against the attack.

The behavioral analytics engine 170 can work in conjunction with aSecurity Information and Event Management (SIEM) 172 system. In variousimplementations, SIEM includes software and/or services that can providereal-time analysis of security alerts generates by network hardware andapplications. In various implementations, the deception center 108 cancommunicate with the SIEM 172 system to obtain information aboutcomputing and/or networking systems in the site network 104.

Using deceptive security mechanisms, the network security system 100 maythus be able to distract and divert attacks on the site network 104. Thenetwork security system 100 may also be able to allow, using theemulated network 116, and attack to proceed, so that as much can belearned about the attack as possible. Information about the attack canthen be used to find vulnerabilities in the site network 104.Information about the attack can also be provided to the securitycommunity 180, so that the attack can be thwarted elsewhere.

II. Customer Installations

The network security system, such as the deception-based systemdescribed above, may be flexibly implemented to accommodate differentcustomer networks. FIGS. 2A-2D provide examples of differentinstallation configurations 200 a-200 d that can be used for differentcustomer networks 202. A customer network 202 may generally be describedas a network or group of networks that is controlled by a common entity,such as a business, a school, or a person. The customer network 202 mayinclude one or more site networks 204. The customer network's 202 sitenetworks 204 may be located in one geographic location, may be behind acommon firewall, and/or may be multiple subnets within one network.Alternatively or additionally, a customer network's 202 site networks204 may be located in different geographic locations, and be connectedto each other over various private and public networks, including theInternet 250.

Different customer networks 202 may have different requirementsregarding network security. For example, some customer networks 202 mayhave relatively open connections to outside networks such as theInternet 250, while other customer networks 202 have very restrictedaccess to outside networks. The network security system described inFIG. 1 may be configurable to accommodate these variations.

FIG. 2A illustrates one example of an installation configuration 200 a,where a deception center 208 is located within the customer network 202.In this example, being located within the customer network 202 meansthat the deception center 208 is connected to the customer network 202,and is able to function as a node in the customer network 202. In thisexample, the deception center 208 may be located in the same building orwithin the same campus as the site network 204. Alternatively oradditionally, the deception center 208 may be located within thecustomer network 202 but at a different geographic location than thesite network 204. The deception center 208 thus may be within the samesubnet as the site network 204, or may be connected to a differentsubnet within the customer network.

In various implementations, the deception center 208 communicates withsensors 210, which may also be referred to as deception sensors,installed in the site network over network tunnels 220 In this example,the network tunnels 220 may cross one or more intermediate within thecustomer network 202.

In this example, the deception center 208 is able to communicate with asecurity services provider 206 that is located outside the customernetwork 202, such as on the Internet 250. The security services provider206 may provide configuration and other information for the deceptioncenter 208. In some cases, the security services provider 206 may alsoassist in coordinating the security for the customer network 202 whenthe customer network 202 includes multiple site networks 204 located invarious geographic areas.

FIG. 2B illustrates another example of an installation configuration 200b, where the deception center 208 is located outside the customernetwork 202. In this example, the deception center 208 may connected tothe customer network 202 over the Internet 250. In some implementations,the deception center 208 may be co-located with a security servicesprovider, and/or may be provided by the security services provider.

In this example, the tunnels 220 connect the deception center 208 to thesensors 210 through a gateway 262. A gateway is a point in a networkthat connects the network to another network. For example, in thisexample, the gateway 262 connects the customer network 202 to outsidenetworks, such as the Internet 250. The gateway 262 may provide afirewall, which may provide some security for the customer network 202.The tunnels 220 may be able to pass through the firewall using a secureprotocol, such as Secure Socket Shell (SSH) and similar protocols.Secure protocols typically require credentials, which may be provided bythe operator of the customer network 202.

FIG. 2C illustrates another example of an installation configuration 200c, where the deception center 208 is located inside the customer network202 but does not have access to outside networks. In someimplementations, the customer network 202 may require a high level ofnetwork security. In these implementations, the customer network's 202connections to the other networks may be very restricted. Thus, in thisexample, the deception center 208 is located within the customer network202, and does not need to communicate with outside networks. Thedeception center 208 may use the customer networks 202 internal networkto coordinate with and establish tunnels 220 to the sensors 210.Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator may configure thedeception center 208 and sensors 210 to enable them to establish thetunnels 220.

FIG. 2D illustrates another example of an installation configuration 200d. In this example, the deception center 208 is located inside thecustomer network 202, and further is directly connected to the sitenetwork 204. Directly connected, in this example, can mean that thedeception center 208 is connected to a router, hub, switch, repeater, orother network infrastructure device that is part of the site network204. Directly connected can alternatively or additionally mean that thedeception center 208 is connected to the site network 204 using aVirtual Local Area Network (VLAN). For example, the deception center 208can be connected to VLAN trunk port. In these examples, the deceptioncenter 208 can project deceptions into the site network 204 with orwithout the use of sensors, such as are illustrated in FIGS. 2A-2C.

In the example of FIG. 2D, the deception center 208 can also optionallybe connected to an outside security services provider 206. The securityservices provider 206 can manage the deception center 208, includingproviding updated security data, sending firmware upgrades, and/orcoordinating different deception centers 208 for different site networks204 belonging to the same customer network 202. In some implementations,the deception center 208 can operate without the assistances of anoutside security services provider 206.

III. Customer Networks

The network security system, such as the deception-based systemdiscussed above, can be used for variety of customer networks. As notedabove, customer networks can come in wide variety of configurations. Forexample, a customer network may have some of its network infrastructure“in the cloud.” A customer network can also include a wide variety ofdevices, including what may be considered “traditional” networkequipment, such as servers and routers, and non-traditional,“Internet-of-Things” devices, such as kitchen appliances. Other examplesof customer networks include established industrial networks, or a mixof industrial networks and computer networks.

FIG. 3A-3B illustrate examples of customer networks 302 a-302 b wheresome of the customer networks' 302 a-302 b network infrastructure is “inthe cloud,” that is, is provided by a cloud services provider 354. Theseexample customer networks 302 a-302 b may be defended by a networksecurity system that includes a deception center 308 and sensors 310,which may also be referred to as deception sensors, and may also includean off-site security services provider 306.

A cloud services provider is a company that offers some component ofcloud computer—such as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as aService (SaaS) or Platform as Service (PaaS)—to other businesses andindividuals. A cloud services provider may have a configurable pool ofcomputing resources, including, for example, networks, servers, storage,applications, and services. These computing resources can be availableon demand, and can be rapidly provisioned. While a cloud servicesprovider's resources may be shared between the cloud service provider'scustomers, from the perspective of each customer, the individualcustomer may appear to have a private network within the cloud,including for example having dedicated subnets and IP addresses.

In the examples illustrated in FIGS. 3A-3B, the customer networks' 302a-302 b network is partially in a site network 304, and partiallyprovided by the cloud services provider 354. In some cases, the sitenetwork 304 is the part of the customer networks 302 a-302 b that islocated at a physical site owned or controlled by the customer network302 a-302 b. For example, the site network 304 may be a network locatedin the customer network's 302 a-302 b office or campus. Alternatively oradditionally, the site network 304 may include network equipment ownedand/or operated by the customer network 302 that may be locatedanywhere. For example, the customer networks' 302 a-302 b operations mayconsist of a few laptops owned by the customer networks 302 a-302 b,which are used from the private homes of the lap tops' users, from aco-working space, from a coffee shop, or from some other mobilelocation.

In various implementations, sensors 310 may be installed in the sitenetwork 304. The sensors 310 can be used by the network security systemto project deceptions into the site network 304, monitor the sitenetwork 304 for attacks, and/or to divert suspect attacks into thedeception center 308.

In some implementations, the sensors 310 may also be able to projectdeceptions into the part of the customer networks 302 a-302 b networkthat is provided by the cloud services provider 354. In most cases, itmay not be possible to install sensors 310 inside the network of thecloud services provider 354, but in some implementations, this may notbe necessary. For example, as discussed further below, the deceptioncenter 308 can acquire the subnet address of the network provided by thecloud services provider 354, and use that subnet address the createdeceptions. Though these deceptions are projected form the sensors 310installed in the site network 304, the deceptions may appear to bewithin the subnet provided by the cloud services provider 354.

In illustrated examples, the deception center 308 is installed insidethe customer networks 302 a-302 b. Though not illustrated here, thedeception center 308 can also be installed outside the customer networks302 a-302 b, such as for example somewhere on the Internet 350. In someimplementations, the deception center 308 may reside at the samelocation as the security service provider 306. When located outside thecustomer networks 302 a-302 b, the deception center 308 may connect tothe sensors 310 in the site network 304 over various public and/orprivate networks.

FIG. 3A illustrates an example of a configuration 300 a where thecustomer network's 302 a network infrastructure is located in the cloudand the customer network 302 a also has a substantial site network 304.In this example, the customer may have an office where the site network304 is located, and where the customer's employees access and use thecustomer network 302 a. For example, developers, sales and marketingpersonnel, human resources and finance employees, may access thecustomer network 302 a from the site network 304. In the illustratedexample, the customer may obtain applications and services from thecloud services provider 354. Alternatively or additionally, the cloudservices provider 354 may provide data center services for the customer.For example, the cloud services provider 354 may host the customer'srepository of data (e.g., music provided by a streaming music service,or video provided by a streaming video provider). In this example, thecustomer's own customers may be provided data directly from the cloudservices provider 354, rather than from the customer network 302 a.

FIG. 3B illustrates and example of a configuration 300 b where thecustomer network's 302 b network is primarily or sometimes entirely inthe cloud. In this example, the customer network's 302 b site network304 may include a few laptops, or one or two desktop servers. Thesecomputing devices may be used by the customer's employees to conduct thecustomer's business, while the cloud services provider 354 provides themajority of the network infrastructure needed by the customer. Forexample, a very small company may have no office space and no dedicatedlocation, and have as computing resources only the laptops used by itsemployees. This small company may use the cloud services provider 354 toprovide its fixed network infrastructure. The small company may accessthis network infrastructure by connecting a laptop to any availablenetwork connection (e.g, in a co-working space, library, or coffeeshop). When no laptops are connected to the cloud services provider 354,the customer network 302 may be existing entirely within the cloud.

In the example provided above, the site network 304 can be foundwherever the customer's employees connect to a network and can accessthe cloud services provider 354. Similarly, the sensors 310 can beco-located with the employees' laptops. For example, whenever anemployee connects to a network, she can enable a sensor 310, which canthen project deceptions into the network around her. Alternatively oradditionally, sensors 310 can be installed in a fixed location (such asthe home of an employee of the customer) from which they can access thecloud services provider 354 and project deceptions into the networkprovided by the cloud services provider 354.

The network security system, such as the deception-based systemdiscussed above, can provide network security for a variety of customernetworks, which may include a diverse array of devices. FIG. 4illustrates an example of an enterprise network 400, which is one suchnetwork that can be defended by a network security system. The exampleenterprise network 400 illustrates examples of various network devicesand network clients that may be included in an enterprise network. Theenterprise network 400 may include more or fewer network devices and/ornetwork clients, and/or may include network devices, additional networksincluding remote sites 452, and/or systems not illustrated here.Enterprise networks may include networks installed at a large site, suchas a corporate office, a university campus, a hospital, a governmentoffice, or a similar entity. An enterprise network may include multiplephysical sites. Access to an enterprise networks is typicallyrestricted, and may require authorized users to enter a password orotherwise authenticate before using the network. A network such asillustrated by the example enterprise network 400 may also be found atsmall sites, such as in a small business.

The enterprise network 400 may be connected to an external network 450.The external network 450 may be a public network, such as the Internet.A public network is a network that has been made accessible to anydevice that can connect to it. A public network may have unrestrictedaccess, meaning that, for example, no password or other authenticationis required to connect to it. The external network 450 may includethird-party telecommunication lines, such as phone lines, broadcastcoaxial cable, fiber optic cables, satellite communications, cellularcommunications, and the like. The external network 450 may include anynumber of intermediate network devices, such as switches, routers,gateways, servers, and/or controllers that are not directly part of theenterprise network 400 but that facilitate communication between thenetwork 400 and other network-connected entities, such as a remote site452.

Remote sites 452 are networks and/or individual computers that aregenerally located outside the enterprise network 400, and which may beconnected to the enterprise network 400 through intermediate networks,but that function as if within the enterprise network 400 and connecteddirectly to it. For example, an employee may connect to the enterprisenetwork 400 while at home, using various secure protocols, and/or byconnecting to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) provided by the enterprisenetwork 400. While the employee's computer is connected, the employee'shome is a remote site 452. Alternatively or additionally, the enterprisenetwork's 400 owner may have a satellite office with a small internalnetwork. This satellite office's network may have a fixed connection tothe enterprise network 400 over various intermediate networks. Thissatellite office can also be considered a remote site.

The enterprise network 400 may be connected to the external network 450using a gateway device 404. The gateway device 404 may include afirewall or similar system for preventing unauthorized access whileallowing authorized access to the enterprise network 400. Examples ofgateway devices include routers, modems (e.g. cable, fiber optic,dial-up, etc.), and the like.

The gateway device 404 may be connected to a switch 406 a. The switch406 a provides connectivity between various devices in the enterprisenetwork 400. In this example, the switch 406 a connects together thegateway device 404, various servers 408, 412, 414, 416, 418, an anotherswitch 406 b. A switch typically has multiple ports, and functions todirect packets received on one port to another port. In someimplementations, the gateway device 404 and the switch 406 a may becombined into a single device.

Various servers may be connected to the switch 406 a. For example, aprint server 408 may be connected to the switch 406 a. The print server408 may provide network access to a number of printers 410. Clientdevices connected to the enterprise network 400 may be able to accessone of the printers 410 through the printer server 408.

Other examples of servers connected to the switch 406 a include a fileserver 412, database server 414, and email server 416. The file server412 may provide storage for and access to data. This data may beaccessible to client devices connected to the enterprise network 400.The database server 414 may store one or more databases, and provideservices for accessing the databases. The email server 416 may host anemail program or service, and may also store email for users on theenterprise network 400.

As yet another example, a server rack 418 may be connected to the switch406. The server rack 418 may house one or more rack-mounted servers. Theserver rack 418 may have one connection to the switch 406 a, or may havemultiple connections to the switch 406 a. The servers in the server rack418 may have various purposes, including providing computing resources,file storage, database storage and access, and email, among others.

An additional switch 406 b may also be connected to the first switch 406a. The additional switch 406 b may be provided to expand the capacity ofthe network. A switch typically has a limited number of ports (e.g., 8,16, 32, 64 or more ports). In most cases, however, a switch can directtraffic to and from another switch, so that by connecting the additionalswitch 406 b to the first switch 406 a, the number of available portscan be expanded.

In this example, a server 420 is connected to the additional switch 406b. The server 420 may manage network access for a number of networkdevices or client devices. For example, the server 420 may providenetwork authentication, arbitration, prioritization, load balancing, andother management services as needed to manage multiple network devicesaccessing the enterprise network 400. The server 420 may be connected toa hub 422. The hub 422 may include multiple ports, each of which mayprovide a wired connection for a network or client device. A hub istypically a simpler device than a switch, and may be used whenconnecting a small number of network devices together. In some cases, aswitch can be substituted for the hub 422. In this example, the hub 422connects desktop computers 424 and laptop computers 426 to theenterprise network 400. In this example, each of the desktop computers424 and laptop computers 426 are connected to the hub 422 using aphysical cable.

In this example, the additional switch 406 b is also connected to awireless access point 428. The wireless access point 428 provideswireless access to the enterprise network 400 for wireless-enablednetwork or client devices. Examples of wireless-enabled network andclient devices include laptops 430, tablet computers 432, and smartphones 434, among others. In some implementations, the wireless accesspoint 428 may also provide switching and/or routing functionality.

The example enterprise network 400 of FIG. 4 is defended from networkthreats by a network threat detection and analysis system, which usesdeception security mechanisms to attract and divert attacks on thenetwork. The deceptive security mechanisms may be controlled by andinserted into the enterprise network 400 using a deception center 498and sensors 490, which may also be referred to as deception sensors,installed in various places in the enterprise network 400. In someimplementations, the deception center 498 and the sensors 490 interactwith a security services provider 496 located outside of the enterprisenetwork 400. The deception center 498 may also obtain or exchange datawith sources located on external networks 450, such as the Internet.

In various implementations, the sensors 490 are a minimal combination ofhardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection withthe enterprise network 400 and a network tunnel 480 with the deceptioncenter 498. For example, a sensor 490 may be constructed using alow-power processor, a network interface, and a simple operating system.In some implementations, any of the devices in the enterprise network(e.g., the servers 408, 412, 416, 418 the printers 410, the computingdevices 424, 426, 430, 432, 434, or the network infrastructure devices404, 406 a, 406 b, 428) can be configured to act as a sensor.

In various implementations, one or more sensors 490 can be installedanywhere in the enterprise network 400, include being attached switches406 a, hubs 422, wireless access points 428, and so on. The sensors 490can further be configured to be part of one or more VLANs. The sensors490 provide the deception center 498 with visibility into the enterprisenetwork 400, such as for example being able to operate as a node in theenterprise network 400, and/or being able to present or projectdeceptive security mechanisms into the enterprise network 400.Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors 490 may provide aportal through which a suspected attack on the enterprise network 400can be redirected to the deception center 498.

The deception center 498 provides network security for the enterprisenetwork 400 by deploying security mechanisms into the enterprise network400, monitoring the enterprise network 400 through the securitymechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzingnetwork activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide securityfor the enterprise network 400, in various implementations the deceptioncenter 498 may communicate with sensors 490 installed in the enterprisenetwork 400, using, for example, network tunnels 480. The tunnels 480may allow the deception center 498 to be located in a differentsub-network (“subnet”) than the enterprise network 400, on a differentnetwork, or remote from the enterprise network 400, with intermediatenetworks between the deception center 498 and the enterprise network400. In some implementations, the enterprise network 400 can includemore than one deception center 498. In some implementations, thedeception center may be located off-site, such as in an external network450.

In some implementations, the security services provider 496 may act as acentral hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possiblyincluding site networks controlled by different organizations. Forexample, the security services provider 496 may communicate withmultiple deception centers 498 that each provide security for adifferent enterprise network 400 for the same organization. As anotherexample, the security services provider 496 may coordinate theactivities of the deception center 498 and the sensors 490, such asenabling the deception center 498 and the sensors 490 to connect to eachother. In some implementations, the security services provider 496 islocated outside the enterprise network 400. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider 496 is controlled by a different entity thanthe entity that controls the site network. For example, the securityservices provider 496 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations,the security services provider 496 is controlled by the same entity asthat controls the enterprise network 400. In some implementations, thenetwork security system does not include a security services provider496.

FIG. 4 illustrates one example of what can be considered a “traditional”network, that is, a network that is based on the interconnection ofcomputers. In various implementations, a network security system, suchas the deception-based system discussed above, can also be used todefend “non-traditional” networks that include devices other thantraditional computers, such as for example mechanical, electrical, orelectromechanical devices, sensors, actuators, and control systems. Such“non-traditional” networks may be referred to as the Internet of Things(IoT). The Internet of Things encompasses newly-developed, every-daydevices designed to be networked (e.g., drones, self-drivingautomobiles, etc.) as well as common and long-established machinery thathas augmented to be connected to a network (e.g., home appliances,traffic signals, etc.).

FIG. 5 illustrates a general example of an IoT network 500. The exampleIoT network 500 can be implemented wherever sensors, actuators, andcontrol systems can be found. For example, the example IoT network 500can be implemented for buildings, roads and bridges, agriculture,transportation and logistics, utilities, air traffic control, factories,and private homes, among others. In various implementations, the IoTnetwork 500 includes cloud service 554 that collects data from varioussensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, located in various locations. Usingthe collected data, the cloud service 554 can provide services 520,control of machinery and equipment 514, exchange of data withtraditional network devices 516, and/or exchange of data with userdevices 518. In some implementations, the cloud service 554 can workwith a deception center 528 and/or a security service provider 526 toprovide security for the network 500.

A cloud service, such as the illustrated cloud service 554, is aresource provided over the Internet 550. Sometimes synonymous with“cloud computing,” the resource provided by the cloud services is in the“cloud” in that the resource is provided by hardware and/or software atsome location remote from the place where the resource is used. Often,the hardware and software of the cloud service is distributed acrossmultiple physical locations. Generally, the resource provided by thecloud service is not directly associated with specific hardware orsoftware resources, such that use of the resource can continue when thehardware or software is changed. The resource provided by the cloudservice can often also be shared between multiple users of the cloudservice, without affecting each user's use. The resource can often alsobe provided as needed or on-demand. Often, the resource provided by thecloud service 554 is automated, or otherwise capable of operating withlittle or no assistance from human operators.

Examples of cloud services include software as a service (SaaS),infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS),desktop as a service (DaaS), managed software as a service (MSaaS),mobile backend as a service (MBaaS), and information technologymanagement as a service (ITMaas). Specific examples of cloud servicesinclude data centers, such as those operated by Amazon Web Services andGoogle Web Services, among others, that provide general networking andsoftware services. Other examples of cloud services include thoseassociated with smartphone applications, or “apps,” such as for exampleapps that track fitness and health, apps that allow a user to remotelymanage her home security system or thermostat, and networked gamingapps, among others. In each of these examples, the company that providesthe app may also provide cloud-based storage of application data,cloud-based software and computing resources, and/or networkingservices. In some cases, the company manages the cloud services providedby the company, including managing physical hardware resources. In othercases, the company leases networking time from a data center provider.

In some cases, the cloud service 554 is part of one integrated system,run by one entity. For example, the cloud service 554 can be part of atraffic control system. In this example, sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512d can be used to monitor traffic and road conditions. In this example,the cloud service 554 can attempt to optimize the flow of traffic andalso provide traffic safety. For example, the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512a-512 d can include a sensor 512 a on a bridge that monitors iceformation. When the sensor 512 a detects that ice has formed on thebridge, the sensor 512 a can alert the cloud service 554. The cloudservice 554, can respond by interacting with machinery and equipment 514that manages traffic in the area of the bridge. For example, the cloudservice 554 can turn on warning signs, indicating to drivers that thebridge is icy. Generally, the interaction between the sensor 512, thecloud service 554, and the machinery and equipment 514 is automated,requiring little or no management by human operators.

In various implementations, the cloud service 554 collects or receivesdata from sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, distributed across one ormore networks. The sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d include devicescapable of “sensing” information, such as air or water temperature, airpressure, weight, motion, humidity, fluid levels, noise levels, and soon. The sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d can alternatively oradditionally include devices capable of receiving input, such ascameras, microphones, touch pads, keyboards, key pads, and so on. Insome cases, a group of sensors 510 a-510 d may be common to one customernetwork 502. For example, the sensors 510 a-510 d may be motion sensors,traffic cameras, temperature sensors, and other sensors for monitoringtraffic in a city's metro area. In this example, the sensors 510 a-510 dcan be located in one area of the city, or be distribute across thecity, and be connected to a common network. In these cases, the sensors510 a-510 d can communicate with a gateway device 562, such as a networkgateway. The gateway device 562 can further communicate with the cloudservice 554.

In some cases, in addition to receiving data from sensors 510 a-510 d inone customer network 502, the cloud service 554 can also receive datafrom sensors 512 a-512 d in other sites 504 a-504 c. These other sites504 a-504 c can be part of the same customer network 502 or can beunrelated to the customer network 502. For example, the other sites 504a-504 c can each be the metro area of a different city, and the sensors512 a-512 d can be monitoring traffic for each individual city.

Generally, communication between the cloud service 554 and the sensors510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d is bidirectional. For example, the sensors 510a-510 d, 512 a-512 d can send information to the cloud service 554. Thecloud service 554 can further provide configuration and controlinformation to the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d. For example, thecloud service 554 can enable or disable a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512d or modify the operation of a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, such aschanging the format of the data provided by a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512a-512 d or upgrading the firmware of a sensor 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d.

In various implementations, the cloud service 554 can operate on thedata received from the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, and use thisdata to interact with services 520 provided by the cloud service 554, orto interact with machinery and equipment 514, network devices 516,and/or user devices 518 available to the cloud service 554. Services 520can include software-based services, such as cloud-based applications,website services, or data management services. Services 520 canalternatively or additionally include media, such as streaming video ormusic or other entertainment services. Services 520 can also includedelivery and/or coordination of physical assets, such as for examplepackage delivery, direction of vehicles for passenger pick-up anddrop-off, or automate re-ordering and re-stocking of supplies. Invarious implementations, services 520 may be delivered to and used bythe machinery and equipment 514, the network devices 516, and/or theuser devices 518.

In various implementations, the machinery and equipment 514 can includephysical systems that can be controlled by the cloud service 554.Examples of machinery and equipment 514 include factory equipment,trains, electrical street cars, self-driving cars, traffic lights, gateand door locks, and so on. In various implementations, the cloud service554 can provide configuration and control of the machinery and equipment514 in an automated fashion.

The network devices 516 can include traditional networking equipment,such as server computers, data storage devices, routers, switches,gateways, and so on. In various implementations, the cloud service 554can provide control and management of the network devices 516, such asfor example automated upgrading of software, security monitoring, orasset tracking. Alternatively or additionally, in variousimplementations the cloud service 554 can exchange data with the networkdevices 516, such as for example providing websites, providing stocktrading data, or providing online shopping resources, among others.Alternatively or additionally, the network devices 516 can includecomputing systems used by the cloud service provider to manage the cloudservice 554.

The user devices 518 can include individual personal computers, smartphones, tablet devices, smart watches, fitness trackers, medicaldevices, and so on that can be associated with an individual user. Thecloud service 554 can exchange data with the user devices 518, such asfor example provide support for applications installed on the userdevices 518, providing websites, providing streaming media, providingdirectional navigation services, and so on. Alternatively oradditionally, the cloud service 554 may enable a user to use a userdevice 518 to access and/or view other devices, such as the sensors 510a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, the machinery and equipment 514, or the networkdevices 516.

In various implementations, the services 520, machinery and equipment514, network devices 516, and user devices 518 may be part of onecustomer network 506. In some cases, this customer network 506 is thesame as the customer network 502 that includes the sensors 510 a-510 d.In some cases, the services 520, machinery and equipment 514, networkdevices 516, and user devices 518 are part of the same network, and mayinstead be part of various other networks 506.

In various implementations, customer networks can include a deceptioncenter 598. The deception center 598 provides network security for theIoT network 500 by deploying security mechanisms into the IoT network500, monitoring the IoT network 500 through the security mechanisms,detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing networkactivity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for theIoT network 500, in various implementations the deception center 598 maycommunicate with the sensors 510 a-5106 d, 512 a-5012 installed in theIoT network 500, for example through the cloud service 554. In someimplementations, the IoT network 500 can include more than one deceptioncenter 598. For example, each of customer network 502 and customernetworks or other networks 506 can include a deception center 528.

In some implementations, the deception center 598 and the sensors 510a-510 d, 512 a-512 d interact with a security services provider 596. Insome implementations, the security services provider 596 may act as acentral hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possiblyincluding site networks controlled by different organizations. Forexample, the security services provider 596 may communicate withmultiple deception centers 598 that each provide security for adifferent IoT network 500 for the same organization. As another example,the security services provider 596 may coordinate the activities of thedeception center 598 and the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512 d, such asenabling the deception center 598 and the sensors 510 a-510 d, 512 a-512d to connect to each other. In some implementations, the securityservices provider 596 is integrated into the cloud service 554. In someimplementations, the security services provider 596 is controlled by adifferent entity than the entity that controls the site network. Forexample, the security services provider 596 may be an outside vendor. Insome implementations, the security services provider 596 is controlledby the same entity as that controls the IoT network 500. In someimplementations, the network security system does not include a securityservices provider 596.

IoT networks can also include small networks of non-traditional devices.FIG. 6 illustrates an example of a customer network that is a smallnetwork 600, here implemented in a private home. A network for a home isan example of small network that may have both traditional andnon-traditional network devices connected to the network 600, in keepingwith an Internet of Things approach. Home networks are also an exampleof networks that are often implemented with minimal security. Theaverage homeowner is not likely to be a sophisticated network securityexpert, and may rely on his modem or router to provide at least somebasic security. The homeowner, however, is likely able to at least setup a basic home network. A deception-based network security device maybe as simple to set up as a home router or base station, yet providesophisticated security for the network 600.

The example network 600 of FIG. 6 may be a single network, or mayinclude multiple sub-networks. These sub-networks may or may notcommunicate with each other. For example, the network 600 may include asub-network that uses the electrical wiring in the house as acommunication channel. Devices configured to communicate in this way mayconnect to the network using electrical outlets, which also provide thedevices with power. The sub-network may include a central controllerdevice, which may coordinate the activities of devices connected to theelectrical network, including turning devices on and off at particulartimes. One example of a protocol that uses the electrical wiring as acommunication network is X10.

The network 600 may also include wireless and wired networks, built intothe home or added to the home solely for providing a communicationmedium for devices in the house. Examples of wireless, radio-basednetworks include networks using protocols such as Z-Wave™, Zigbee™ (alsoknown as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)802.15.4), Bluetooth™, and Wi-Fi (also known as IEEE 802.11), amongothers. Wireless networks can be set up by installing a wireless basestation in the house. Alternatively or additionally, a wireless networkcan be established by having at least two devices in the house that areable to communicate with each other using the same protocol.

Examples of wired networks include Ethernet (also known as IEEE 802.3),token ring (also known as IEEE 802.5), Fiber Distributed Data Interface(FDDI), and Attached Resource Computer Network (ARCNET), among others. Awired network can be added to the house by running cabling through thewalls, ceilings, and/or floors, and placing jacks in various rooms thatdevices can connect to with additional cables. The wired network can beextended using routers, switches, and/or hubs. In many cases, wirednetworks may be interconnected with wireless networks, with theinterconnected networks operating as one seamless network. For example,an Ethernet network may include a wireless base station that provides aWi-Fi signal for devices in the house.

As noted above, a small network 600 implemented in a home is one thatmay include both traditional network devices and non-traditional,everyday electronics and appliances that have also been connected to thenetwork 600. Examples of rooms where one may find non-traditionaldevices connected to the network are the kitchen and laundry rooms. Forexample, in the kitchen a refrigerator 604, oven 606, microwave 608, anddishwasher 610 may be connected to the network 600, and in the laundryroom a washing machine 612 may be connected to the network 600. Byattaching these appliances to the network 600, the homeowner can monitorthe activity of each device (e.g., whether the dishes are clean, thecurrent state of a turkey in the oven, or the washing machine cycle) orchange the operation of each device without needing to be in the sameroom or even be at home. The appliances can also be configured toresupply themselves. For example, the refrigerator 604 may detect that acertain product is running low, and may place an order with a grocerydelivery service for the product to be restocked.

The network 600 may also include environmental appliances, such as athermostat 602 and a water heater 614. By having these devices connectedto the network 600, the homeowner can monitor the current environment ofthe house (e.g., the air temperature or the hot water temperature), andadjust the settings of these appliances while at home or away.Furthermore, software on the network 600 or on the Internet 650 maytrack energy usage for the heating and cooling units and the waterheater 614. This software may also track energy usage for the otherdevices, such as the kitchen and laundry room appliances. The energyusage of each appliance may be available to the homeowner over thenetwork 600.

In the living room, various home electronics may be on the network 600.These electronics may have once been fully analog or may have beenstandalone devices, but now include a network connection for exchangingdata with other devices in the network 600 or with the Internet 650. Thehome electronics in this example include a television 618, a gamingsystem 620, and a media device 622 (e.g., a video and/or audio player).Each of these devices may play media hosted, for example, on networkattached storage 636 located elsewhere in the network 600, or mediahosted on the Internet 650.

The network 600 may also include home safety and security devices, suchas a smoke detector 616, an electronic door lock 624, and a homesecurity system 626. Having these devices on the network may allow thehomeowner to track the information monitored and/or sensed by thesedevices, both when the homeowner is at home and away from the house. Forexample, the homeowner may be able to view a video feed from a securitycamera 628. When the safety and security devices detect a problem, theymay also inform the homeowner. For example, the smoke detector 616 maysend an alert to the homeowner's smartphone when it detects smoke, orthe electronic door lock 624 may alert the homeowner when there has beena forced entry. Furthermore, the homeowner may be able to remotelycontrol these devices. For example, the homeowner may be able toremotely open the electronic door lock 624 for a family member who hasbeen locked out. The safety and security devices may also use theirconnection to the network to call the fire department or police ifnecessary.

Another non-traditional device that may be found in the network 600 isthe family car 630. The car 630 is one of many devices, such as laptopcomputers 638, tablet computers 646, and smartphones 642, that connectto the network 600 when at home, and when not at home, may be able toconnect to the network 600 over the Internet 650. Connecting to thenetwork 600 over the Internet 650 may provide the homeowner with remoteaccess to his network. The network 600 may be able to provideinformation to the car 630 and receive information from the car 630while the car is away. For example, the network 600 may be able to trackthe location of the car 630 while the car 630 is away.

In the home office and elsewhere around the house, this example network600 includes some traditional devices connected to the network 600. Forexample, the home office may include a desktop computer 632 and networkattached storage 636. Elsewhere around the house, this example includesa laptop computer 638 and handheld devices such as a tablet computer 646and a smartphone 642. In this example, a person 640 is also connected tothe network 600. The person 640 may be connected to the network 600wirelessly through personal devices worn by the person 640, such as asmart watch, fitness tracker, or heart rate monitor. The person 640 mayalternatively or additionally be connected to the network 600 through anetwork-enabled medical device, such as a pacemaker, heart monitor, ordrug delivery system, which may be worn or implanted.

The desktop computer 632, laptop computer 638, tablet computer 646,and/or smartphone 642 may provide an interface that allows the homeownerto monitor and control the various devices connected to the network.Some of these devices, such as the laptop computer 638, the tabletcomputer 646, and the smartphone 642 may also leave the house, andprovide remote access to the network 600 over the Internet 650. In manycases, however, each device on the network may have its own software formonitoring and controlling only that one device. For example, thethermostat 602 may use one application while the media device 622 usesanother, and the wireless network provides yet another. Furthermore, itmay be the case that the various sub-networks in the house do notcommunicate with each other, and/or are viewed and controlled usingsoftware that is unique to each sub-network. In many cases, thehomeowner may not have one unified and easily understood view of hisentire home network 600.

The small network 600 in this example may also include networkinfrastructure devices, such as a router or switch (not shown) and awireless base station 634. The wireless base station 634 may provide awireless network for the house. The router or switch may provide a wirednetwork for the house. The wireless base station 634 may be connected tothe router or switch to provide a wireless network that is an extensionof the wired network. The router or switch may be connected to a gatewaydevice 648 that connects the network 600 to other networks, includingthe Internet 650. In some cases, a router or switch may be integratedinto the gateway device 648. The gateway device 648 is a cable modem,digital subscriber line (DSL) modem, optical modem, analog modem, orsome other device that connects the network 600 to an ISP. The ISP mayprovide access to the Internet 650. Typically, a home network only hasone gateway device 648. In some cases, the network 600 may not beconnected to any networks outside of the house. In these cases,information about the network 600 and control of devices in the network600 may not be available when the homeowner is not connected to thenetwork 600; that is, the homeowner may not have access to his network600 over the Internet 650.

Typically, the gateway device 648 includes a hardware and/or softwarefirewall. A firewall monitors incoming and outgoing network traffic and,by applying security rules to the network traffic, attempts to keepharmful network traffic out of the network 600. In many cases, afirewall is the only security system protecting the network 600. While afirewall may work for some types of intrusion attempts originatingoutside the network 600, the firewall may not block all intrusionmechanisms, particularly intrusions mechanisms hidden in legitimatenetwork traffic. Furthermore, while a firewall may block intrusionsoriginating on the Internet 650, the firewall may not detect intrusionsoriginating from within the network 600. For example, an infiltrator mayget into the network 600 by connecting to signal from the Wi-Fi basestation 634. Alternatively, the infiltrator may connect to the network600 by physically connecting, for example, to the washing machine 612.The washing machine 612 may have a port that a service technician canconnect to service the machine. Alternatively or additionally, thewashing machine 612 may have a simple Universal Serial Bus (USB) port.Once an intruder has gained access to the washing machine 612, theintruder may have access to the rest of the network 600.

To provide more security for the network 600, a deception-based networksecurity device 660 can be added to the network 600. In someimplementations, the security device 660 is a standalone device that canbe added to the network 600 by connecting it to a router or switch. Insome implementations, the security device 660 can alternatively oradditionally be connected to the network's 600 wireless sub-network bypowering on the security device 660 and providing it with Wi-Ficredentials. The security device 660 may have a touchscreen, or a screenand a keypad, for inputting Wi-Fi credentials. Alternatively oradditionally, the homeowner may be able to enter network informationinto the security device by logging into the security device 660 over aBluetooth™ or Wi-Fi signal using software on a smartphone, tablet, orlaptop, or using a web browser. In some implementations, the securitydevice 660 can be connected to a sub-network running over the home'selectrical wiring by connecting the security device 660 to a poweroutlet. In some implementations, the security device 660 may have ports,interfaces, and/or radio antennas for connecting to the varioussub-networks that can be included in the network 600. This may beuseful, for example, when the sub-networks do not communicate with eachother, or do not communicate with each other seamlessly. Once powered onand connected, the security device 660 may self-configure and monitorthe security of each sub-network in the network 600 that it is connectedto.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may be configured toconnect between the gateway device 648 and the network's 600 primaryrouter, and/or between the gateway device 648 and the gateway device's648 connection to the wall. Connected in one or both of these locations,the security device 660 may be able to control the network's 600connection with outside networks. For example, the security device candisconnect the network 600 from the Internet 650.

In some implementations, the security device 660, instead of beingimplemented as a standalone device, may be integrated into one or moreof the appliances, home electronics, or computing devices (in thisexample network 600), or in some other device not illustrated here. Forexample, the security device 660—or the functionality of the securitydevice 660—may be incorporated into the gateway device 648 or a desktopcomputer 632 or a laptop computer 638. As another example, the securitydevice 660 can be integrated into a kitchen appliance (e.g., therefrigerator 604 or microwave 608), a home media device (e.g., thetelevision 618 or gaming system 620), or the home security system 626.In some implementations, the security device 660 may be a printedcircuit board that can be added to another device without requiringsignificant changes to the other device. In some implementations, thesecurity device 660 may be implemented using an Application SpecificIntegrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) thatcan be added to the electronics of a device. In some implementations,the security device 660 may be implemented as a software module ormodules that can run concurrently with the operating system or firmwareof a networked device. In some implementations, the security device 660may have a physical or virtual security barrier that prevents access toit by the device that it is integrated into. In some implementations,the security device's 660 presence in another device may be hidden fromthe device into which the security device 660 is integrated.

In various implementations, the security device 660 may scan the network600 to determine which devices are present in the network 600.Alternatively or additionally, the security device 660 may communicatewith a central controller in the network 600 (or multiple centralcontrollers, when there are sub-networks, each with their own centralcontroller) to learn which devices are connected to the network 600. Insome implementations, the security device 660 may undergo a learningperiod, during which the security device 660 learns the normal activityof the network 600, such as what time of day appliances and electronicsare used, what they are used for, and/or what data is transferred to andfrom these devices. During the learning period, the security device 660may alert the homeowner to any unusual or suspicious activity. Thehomeowner may indicate that this activity is acceptable, or may indicatethat the activity is an intrusion. As described below, the securitydevice 660 may subsequently take preventive action against theintrusion.

Once the security device 660 has learned the topology and/or activity ofthe network 600, the security device 660 may be able to providedeception-based security for the network 600. In some implementations,the security device 660 may deploy security mechanisms that areconfigured to emulate devices that could be found in the network 600. Insome implementations, the security device 660 may monitor activity onthe network 600, including watching the data sent between the variousdevices on the network 600, and between the devices and the Internet650. The security device 660 may be looking for activity that isunusual, unexpected, or readily identifiable as suspect. Upon detectingsuspicious activity in the network 600, the security device 660 maydeploy deceptive security mechanisms.

In some implementations, the deceptive security mechanisms are softwareprocesses running on the security device 660 that emulate devices thatmay be found in the network 600. In some implementations, the securitydevice 660 may be assisted in emulating the security devices by anotherdevice on the network 600, such as the desktop computer 632. From theperspective of devices connected to the network 600, the securitymechanisms appear just like any other device on the network, including,for example, having an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a Media AccessControl (MAC) address, and/or some other identification information,having an identifiable device type, and responding to or transmittingdata just as would the device being emulated. The security mechanismsmay be emulated by the security device 660 itself; thus, while, from thepoint of view of the network 600, the network 600 appears to haveadditional devices, no physical equivalent (other than the securitydevice 660) can be found in the house.

The devices and data emulated by a security mechanism are selected suchthat the security mechanism is an attractive target for intrusionattempts. Thus, the security mechanism may emulate valuable data, and/ordevices that are easily hacked into, and/or devices that provide easyaccess to the reset of the network 600. Furthermore, the securitymechanisms emulate devices that are likely to be found in the network600, such as a second television, a second thermostat, or another laptopcomputer. In some implementations, the security device 660 may contact aservice on the Internet 650 for assistance in selecting devices toemulate and/or for how to configure emulated devices. The securitydevices 660 may select and configure security mechanisms to beattractive to intrusions attempts, and to deflect attention away frommore valuable or vulnerable network assets. Additionally, the securitymechanisms can assist in confirming that an intrusion into the network600 has actually taken place.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may deploy deceptivesecurity mechanisms in advance of detecting any suspicious activity. Forexample, having scanned the network, the security device 660 maydetermine that the network 600 includes only one television 618 and onesmoke detector 616. The security device 660 may therefore choose todeploy security mechanisms that emulate a second television and a secondsmoke detector. With security mechanisms preemptively added to thenetwork, when there is an intrusion attempt, the intruder may target thesecurity mechanisms instead of valuable or vulnerable network devices.The security mechanisms thus may serve as decoys and may deflect anintruder away from the network's 600 real devices.

In some implementations, the security mechanisms deployed by thesecurity device 660 may take into account specific requirements of thenetwork 600 and/or the type of devices that can be emulated. Forexample, in some cases, the network 600 (or a sub-network) may assignidentifiers to each device connected to the network 600, and/or eachdevice may be required to adopt a unique identifier. In these cases, thesecurity device 660 may assign an identifier to deployed securitymechanisms that do not interfere with identifiers used by actual devicesin the network 600. As another example, in some cases, devices on thenetwork 600 may register themselves with a central controller and/orwith a central service on the Internet 650. For example, the thermostat602 may register with a service on the Internet 650 that monitors energyuse for the home. In these cases, the security mechanisms that emulatethese types of devices may also register with the central controller orthe central service. Doing so may improve the apparent authenticity ofthe security mechanism, and may avoid conflicts with the centralcontroller or central service. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device 660 may determine to deploy security mechanisms thatemulate other devices, and avoid registering with the central controlleror central service.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may dynamically adjustthe security mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, when thehomeowner adds devices to the network 600, the security device 660 mayremove security mechanisms that conflict with the new devices, or changea security mechanism so that the security mechanism's configuration isnot incongruous with the new devices (e.g., the security mechanismsshould not have the same MAC address as a new device). As anotherexample, when the network owner removes a device from the network 600,the security device 660 may add a security mechanism that mimics thedevice that was removed. As another example, the security device maychange the activity of a security mechanism, for example, to reflectchanges in the normal activity of the home, changes in the weather, thetime of year, the occurrence of special events, and so on.

The security device 660 may also dynamically adjust the securitymechanisms it has deployed in response to suspicious activity it hasdetected on the network 600. For example, upon detecting suspiciousactivity, the security device 660 may change the behavior of a securitymechanism or may deploy additional security mechanisms. The changes tothe security mechanisms may be directed by the suspicious activity,meaning that if, for example, the suspicious activity appears to beprobing for a wireless base station 634, the security device 660 maydeploy a decoy wireless base station.

Changes to the security mechanisms are meant not only to attract apossible intrusion, but also to confirm that an intrusion has, in factoccurred. Since the security mechanisms are not part of the normaloperation of the network 600, normal occupants of the home are notexpected to access the security mechanisms. Thus, in most cases, anyaccess of a security mechanism is suspect. Once the security device 660has detected an access to a security mechanism, the security device 660may next attempt to confirm that an intrusion into the network 600 hastaken place. An intrusion can be confirmed, for example, by monitoringactivity at the security mechanism. For example, login attempts, probingof data emulated by the security mechanism, copying of data from thesecurity mechanism, and attempts to log into another part of the network600 from the security mechanism indicate a high likelihood that anintrusion has occurred.

Once the security device 660 is able to confirm an intrusion into thenetwork 600, the security device 660 may alert the homeowner. Forexample, the security device 660 may sound an audible alarm, send anemail or text message to the homeowner or some other designated persons,and/or send an alert to an application running on a smartphone ortablet. As another example, the security device 660 may access othernetwork devices and, for example, flash lights, trigger the securitysystem's 626 alarm, and/or display messages on devices that includedisplay screens, such as the television 618 or refrigerator 604. In someimplementations, depending on the nature of the intrusion, the securitydevice 660 may alert authorities such as the police or fire department.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may also takepreventive actions. For example, when an intrusion appears to haveoriginated outside the network 600, the security device 660 may blockthe network's 600 access to the Internet 650, thus possibly cutting offthe intrusion. As another example, when the intrusion appears to haveoriginated from within the network 600, the security device 660 mayisolate any apparently compromised devices, for example by disconnectingthem from the network 600. When only its own security mechanisms arecompromised, the security device 660 may isolate itself from the rest ofthe network 600. As another example, when the security device 660 isable to determine that the intrusion very likely included physicalintrusion into the house, the security device 660 may alert theauthorities. The security device 660 may further lock down the house by,for example, locking any electronic door locks 624.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may be able to enable ahomeowner to monitor the network 600 when a suspicious activity has beendetected, or at any other time. For example, the homeowner may beprovided with a software application that can be installed on asmartphone, tablet, desktop, and/or laptop computer. The softwareapplication may receive information from the security device 660 over awired or wireless connection. Alternatively or additionally, thehomeowner may be able to access information about his network through aweb browser, where the security device 660 formats webpages fordisplaying the information. Alternatively or additionally, the securitydevice 660 may itself have a touchscreen or a screen and key pad thatprovide information about the network 600 to the homeowner.

The information provided to the homeowner may include, for example, alist and/or graphic display of the devices connected to the network 600.The information may further provide a real-time status of each device,such as whether the device is on or off, the current activity of thedevice, data being transferred to or from the device, and/or the currentuser of the device, among other things. The list or graphic display mayupdate as devices connect and disconnect from the network 600, such asfor example laptops and smartphones connecting to or disconnecting froma wireless sub-network in the network 600. The security device 660 mayfurther alert the homeowner when a device has unexpectedly beendisconnected from the network 600. The security device 660 may furtheralert the homeowner when an unknown device connects to the network 600,such as for example when a device that is not known to the homeownerconnects to the Wi-Fi signal.

The security device 660 may also maintain historic information. Forexample, the security device 660 may provide snapshots of the network600 taken once a day, once a week, or once a month. The security device660 may further provide a list of devices that have, for example,connected to the wireless signal in the last hour or day, at what times,and for how long. The security device 660 may also be able to provideidentification information for these devices, such as MAC addresses orusernames. As another example, the security device 660 may also maintainusage statistics for each device in the network 600, such as for examplethe times at which each device was in use, what the device was used for,how much energy the device used, and so on.

The software application or web browser or display interface thatprovides the homeowner with information about his network 600 may alsoenable the homeowner to make changes to the network 600 or to devices inthe network 600. For example, through the security device 660, thehomeowner may be able to turn devices on or off, change theconfiguration of a device, change a password for a device or for thenetwork, and so on.

In some implementations, the security device 660 may also displaycurrently deployed security mechanisms and their configuration. In someimplementations, the security device 660 may also display activity seenat the security mechanisms, such as for example a suspicious access to asecurity mechanism. In some implementations, the security device 660 mayalso allow the homeowner to customize the security mechanisms. Forexample, the homeowner may be able to add or remove security mechanisms,modify data emulated by the security mechanisms, modify theconfiguration of security mechanism, and/or modify the activity of asecurity mechanism.

A deception-based network security device 660 thus can providesophisticated security for a small network. The security device 660 maybe simple to add to a network, yet provide comprehensive protectionagainst both external and internal intrusions. Moreover, the securitydevice 660 may be able to monitor multiple sub-networks that are eachusing different protocols. The security device 660, using deceptivesecurity mechanisms, may be able to detect and confirm intrusions intothe network 600. The security device 660 may be able to take preventiveactions when an intrusion occurs. The security device 660 may also beable to provide the homeowner with information about his network, andpossibly also control over devices in the network.

FIG. 7 illustrates another example of a small network 700, hereimplemented in a small business. A network in a small business may haveboth traditional and non-traditional devices connected to the network700. Small business networks are also examples of networks that areoften implemented with minimal security. A small business owner may nothave the financial or technical resources, time, or expertise toconfigure a sophisticated security infrastructure for her network 700.The business owner, however, is likely able to at least set up a network700 for the operation of the business. A deception-based networksecurity device that is at least as simple to set up as the network 700itself may provide inexpensive and simple yet sophisticated security forthe network 700.

The example network 700 may be one, single network, or may includemultiple sub-networks. For example, the network 700 may include a wiredsub-network, such as an Ethernet network, and a wireless sub-network,such as an 802.11 Wi-Fi network. The wired sub-network may beimplemented using cables that have been run through the walls and/orceilings to the various rooms in the business. The cables may beconnected to jacks in the walls that devices can connect to in order toconnect to the network 700. The wireless network may be implementedusing a wireless base station 720, or several wireless base stations,which provide a wireless signal throughout the business. The network 700may include other wireless sub-networks, such as a short-distanceBluetooth™ network. In some cases, the sub-networks communicate with oneanother. For example, the Wi-Fi sub-network may be connected to thewired Ethernet sub-network. In some cases, the various sub-networks inthe network 700 may not be configured to or able to communicate witheach other.

As noted above, the small business network 700 may include bothcomputers, network infrastructure devices, and other devices nottraditionally found in a network. The network 700 may also includeelectronics, machinery, and systems that have been connected to thenetwork 700 according to an Internet-of-Things approach. Workshopmachinery that was once purely analog may now have computer controls.Digital workshop equipment may be network-enabled. By connecting shopequipment and machinery to the network 700, automation and efficiency ofthe business can be improved and orders, materials, and inventory can betracked. Having more devices on the network 700, however, may increasethe number of vulnerabilities in the network 700. Devices that have onlyrecently become network-enabled may be particularly vulnerable becausetheir security systems have not yet been hardened through use andattack. A deception-based network security device may providesimple-to-install and sophisticated security for a network that mayotherwise have only minimal security.

The example small business of FIG. 7 includes a front office. In thefront office, the network may include devices for administrative tasks.These devices may include, for example, a laptop computer 722 and atelephone 708. These devices may be attached to the network 700 in orderto, for example, access records related to the business, which may bestored on a server 732 located elsewhere in the building. In the frontoffice, security devices for the building may also be found, including,for example, security system controls 724 and an electronic door lock726. Having the security devices on the network 700 may enable thebusiness owner to remotely control access to the building. The businessowner may also be able to remotely monitor the security of building,such as for example being able to view video streams from securitycameras 742. The front office may also be where environmental controls,such as a thermostat 702, are located. Having the thermostat 702 on thenetwork 700 may allow the business owner to remotely control thetemperature settings. A network-enabled thermostat 702 may also trackenergy usage for the heating and cooling systems. The front office mayalso include safety devices, such as a network-connected smoke alarm728. A network-connected smoke alarm may be able to inform the businessowner that there is a problem in the building be connecting to thebusiness owner's smartphone or computer.

Another workspace in this example small business is a workshop. In theworkshop, the network 700 may include production equipment for producingthe goods sold by the business. The production equipment may include,for example, manufacturing machines 704 (e.g. a milling machine, aComputer Numerical Control (CNC) machine, a 3D printer, or some othermachine tool) and a plotter 706. The production equipment may becontrolled by a computer on the network 700, and/or may receive productdesigns over the network 700 and independently execute the designs. Inthe workshop, one may also find other devices related to themanufacturing of products, such as radiofrequency identification (RFID)scanners, barcode or Quick Response (QR) code generators, and otherdevices for tracking inventory, as well as electronic tools, hand tools,and so on.

In the workshop and elsewhere in the building, mobile computing devicesand people 738 may also be connected to the network 700. Mobilecomputing devices include, for example, tablet computers 734 andsmartphones 736. These devices may be used to control productionequipment, track supplies and inventory, receive and track orders,and/or for other operations of the business. People 738 may be connectedto the network through network-connected devices worn or implanted inthe people 738, such as for example smart watches, fitness trackers,heart rate monitors, drug delivery systems, pacemakers, and so on.

At a loading dock, the example small business may have a delivery van748 and a company car 746. When these vehicles are away from thebusiness, they may be connected to the network 700 remotely, for exampleover the Internet 750. By being able to communicate with the network700, the vehicles may be able to receive information such as productdelivery information (e.g., orders, addresses, and/or delivery times),supply pickup instructions, and so on. The business owner may also beable to track the location of these vehicles from the business location,or over the Internet 750 when away from the business, and/or track whois using the vehicles.

The business may also have a back office. In the back office, thenetwork 700 may include traditional network devices, such as computers730, a multi-function printer 716, a scanner 718, and a server 732. Inthis example, the computers 730 may be used to design products formanufacturing in the workshop, as well as for management of thebusiness, including tracking orders, supplies, inventory, and/or humanresources records. The multi-function printer 716 and scanner 718 maysupport the design work and the running of the business. The server 732may store product designs, orders, supply records, and inventoryrecords, as well as administrative data, such as accounting and humanresources data.

The back office may also be where a gateway device 770 is located. Thegateway device 770 connects the small business to other networks,including the Internet 750. Typically, the gateway device 770 connectsto an ISP, and the ISP provides access to the Internet 750. In somecases, a router may be integrated into the gateway device 770. In somecases, gateway device 770 may be connected to an external router,switch, or hub, not illustrated here. In some cases, the network 700 isnot connected to any networks outside of the business's own network 700.In these cases, the network 700 may not have a gateway device 770.

The back office is also where the network 700 may have a deception-basednetwork security device 760. The security device 760 may be a standalonedevice that may be enabled as soon as it is connected to the network700. Alternatively or additionally, the security device 760 may beintegrated into another device connected to the network 700, such as thegateway device 770, a router, a desktop computer 730, a laptop computer722, the multi-function printer 716, or the thermostat 702, amongothers. When integrated into another device, the security device 760 mayuse the network connection of the other device, or may have its ownnetwork connection for connecting to the network 700. The securitydevice 760 may connect to the network 700 using a wired connection or awireless connection.

Once connected to the network 700, the security device 760 may beginmonitoring the network 700 for suspect activity. In someimplementations, the security device 760 may scan the network 700 tolearn which devices are connected to the network 700. In some cases, thesecurity device 760 may learn the normal activity of the network 700,such as what time the various devices are used, for how long, by whom,for what purpose, and what data is transferred to and from each device,among other things.

In some implementations, having learned the configuration and/oractivity of the network 700, the security device 760 may deploydeceptive security mechanisms. These security mechanisms may emulatedevices that may be found on the network 700, including having anidentifiable device type and/or network identifiers (such as a MACaddress and/or IP address), and being able to send and receive networktraffic that a device of a certain time would send and receive. Forexample, for the example small business, the security device 760 mayconfigure a security mechanism to emulate a 3D printer, a wide-bodyscanner, or an additional security camera. The security device 760 mayfurther avoid configuring a security mechanism to emulate a device thatis not likely to be found in the small business, such as a washingmachine. The security device 760 may use the deployed securitymechanisms to monitor activity on the network 700.

In various implementations, when the security device 760 detects suspectactivity, the security device 760 may deploy additional securitymechanisms. These additional security mechanisms may be selected basedon the nature of suspect activity. For example, when the suspectactivity appears to be attempting to break into the shop equipment, thesecurity device 760 may deploy a security mechanism that looks like shopequipment that is easy to hack. In some implementations, the securitydevice 760 may deploy security mechanisms only after detecting suspectactivity on the network 700.

The security device 760 selects devices to emulate that are particularlyattractive for an infiltration, either because the emulated deviceappears to have valuable data or because the emulated device appears tobe easy to infiltrate, or for some other reason. In someimplementations, the security device 760 connects to a service on theInternet 750 for assistance in determining which devices to emulateand/or how to configure the emulated device. Once deployed, the securitymechanisms serve as decoys to attract the attention of a possibleinfiltrator away from valuable network assets. In some implementations,the security device 760 emulates the security mechanisms using softwareprocesses. In some implementations, the security device 760 may beassisted in emulating security mechanisms by a computer 730 on thenetwork.

In some implementations, the security device 760 may deploy securitymechanisms prior to detecting suspicious activity on the network 700. Inthese implementations, the security mechanisms may present moreattractive targets for a possible, future infiltration, so that if aninfiltration occurs, the infiltrator will go after the securitymechanisms instead of the actual devices on the network 700.

In various implementations, the security device 760 may also change thesecurity mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, the securitydevice 760 may add or remove security mechanisms as the operation of thebusiness changes, as the activity on the network 700 changes, as devicesare added or removed from the network 700, as the time of year changes,and so on.

Besides deflecting a possible network infiltration away from valuable orvulnerable network devices, the security device 760 may use the securitymechanisms to confirm that the network 700 has been infiltrated. Becausethe security mechanisms are not part of actual devices in use by thebusiness, any access to them over the network is suspect. Thus, once thesecurity device 760 detects an access to one of its security mechanisms,the security device 760 may attempt to confirm that this access is, infact, an unauthorized infiltration of the network 700.

To confirm that a security mechanism has been infiltrated, the securitydevice 760 may monitor activity seen at the security mechanism. Thesecurity device 760 may further deploy additional security mechanisms,to see if, for example, it can present an even more attractive target tothe possible infiltrator. The security device 760 may further look forcertain activity, such as log in attempts to other devices in thenetwork, attempts to examine data on the security mechanism, attempts tomove data from the security mechanism to the Internet 750, scanning ofthe network 700, password breaking attempts, and so on.

Once the security device 760 has confirmed that the network 700 has beeninfiltrated, the security device 760 may alert the business owner. Forexample, the security device 760 may sound an audible alarm, email orsend text messages to the computers 730 and/or handheld devices 734,736, send a message to the business's cars 746, 748, flash lights, ortrigger the security system's 724 alarm. In some implementations, thesecurity device 760 may also take preventive measures. For example, thesecurity device 760 may disconnect the network 700 from the Internet750, may disconnect specific devices from the network 700 (e.g., theserver 732 or the manufacturing machines 704), may turn somenetwork-connected devices off, and/or may lock the building.

In various implementations, the security device 760 may allow thebusiness owner to monitor her network 700, either when an infiltrationis taking place or at any other time. For example, the security device760 may provide a display of the devices currently connected to thenetwork 700, including flagging any devices connected to the wirelessnetwork that do not appear to be part of the business. The securitydevice 760 may further display what each device is currently doing, whois using them, how much energy each device is presently using, and/orhow much network bandwidth each device is using. The security device 760may also be able to store this information and provide historicconfiguration and/or usage of the network 700.

The security device 760 may have a display it can use to showinformation to the business owner. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device 760 may provide this information to a softwareapplication that can run on a desktop or laptop computer, a tablet, or asmartphone. Alternatively or additionally, the security device 760 mayformat this information for display through a web browser. The businessowner may further be able to control devices on the network 700 throughan interface provided by the security device 760, including, forexample, turning devices on or off, adjusting settings on devices,configuring user accounts, and so on. The business owner may also beable to view any security mechanisms presently deployed, and may be ableto re-configure the security mechanisms, turn them off, or turn them on.

IoT networks can also include industrial control systems. Industrialcontrol system is a general term that encompasses several types ofcontrol systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS) and other controlsystem configurations, such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),often found in the industrial sectors and infrastructures. Industrialcontrol systems are often found in industries such as electrical, waterand wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation,pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discretemanufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods). While alarge percentage of industrial control systems may be privately ownedand operated, federal agencies also operate many industrial processes,such as air traffic control systems and materials handling (e.g., PostalService mail handling).

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrialcontrol system 800. Generally, an industrial control system 800 mayinclude a control loop 802, a human-machine interface 806, and remotediagnostics and maintenance 808. In some implementations, the exampleindustrial control system can be defended by a network threat detectionand analysis system, which can include a deception center 898 and asecurity services provider 896.

A control loop 802 may consist of sensors 812, controller 804 hardwaresuch as PLCs, actuators 810, and the communication of variables 832,834. The sensors 812 may be used for measuring variables in the system,while the actuators 810 may include, for example, control valvesbreakers, switches, and motors. Some of the sensors 812 may bedeceptions sensors. Controlled variables 834 may be transmitted to thecontroller 804 from the sensors 812. The controller 804 may interpretthe controlled variables 834 and generates corresponding manipulatedvariables 832, based on set points provided by controller interaction830. The controller 804 may then transmit the manipulated variables 832to the actuators 810. The actuators 810 may drive a controlled process814 (e.g., a machine on an assembly line). The controlled process 814may accept process inputs 822 (e.g., raw materials) and produce processoutputs 824 (e.g., finished products). New information 820 provided tothe controlled process 814 may result in new sensor 812 signals, whichidentify the state of the controlled process 814 and which may alsotransmitted to the controller 804.

In some implementations, at least some of the sensors 812 can alsoprovide the deception center 898 with visibility into the industrialcontrol system 800, such as for example being able to present or projectdeceptive security mechanisms into the industrial control system.Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors 812 may provide aportal through which a suspected attack on the industrial control systemcan be redirected to the deception center 898. The deception center 898and the sensors 812 may be able to communicate using network tunnels880.

The deception center 898 provides network security for the industrialcontrol system 800 by deploying security mechanisms into the industrialcontrol system 800, monitoring the industrial control system through thesecurity mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, andanalyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. In someimplementations, the industrial control system 800 can include more thanone deception center 898. In some implementations, the deception centermay be located off-site, such as on the Internet.

In some implementations, the deception center 898 may interact with asecurity services provider 896 located outside the industrial controlsystem 800. The security services provider 896 may act as a central hubfor providing security to multiple sites that are part of the industrialcontrol system 800, and/or for multiple separate, possibly unrelated,industrial control systems. For example, the security services provider896 may communicate with multiple deception centers 898 that eachprovide security for a different industrial control system 800 for thesame organization. As another example, the security services provider896 may coordinate the activities of the deception center 898 and thesensors 812, such as enabling the deception center 898 and the sensors812 to connect to each other. In some implementations, the securityservices provider 896 is located outside the industrial control system800. In some implementations, the security services provider 896 iscontrolled by a different entity than the entity that controls the sitenetwork. For example, the security services provider 896 may be anoutside vendor. In some implementations, the security services provider896 is controlled by the same entity as that controls the industrialcontrol system. In some implementations, the network security systemdoes not include a security services provider 896.

The human-machine interface 806 provides operators and engineers with aninterface for controller interaction 830. Controller interaction 830 mayinclude monitoring and configuring set points and control algorithms,and adjusting and establishing parameters in the controller 804. Thehuman-machine interface 806 typically also receives information from thecontroller 804 that allows the human-machine interface 806 to displayprocess status information and historical information about theoperation of the control loop 802.

The remote diagnostics and maintenance 808 utilities are typically usedto prevent, identify, and recover from abnormal operation or failures.For diagnostics, the remote diagnostics and maintenance utilities 808may monitor the operation of each of the controller 804, sensors 812,and actuators 810. To recover after a problem, the remote diagnosticsand maintenance 808 utilities may provide recovery information andinstructions to one or more of the controller 804, sensors 812, and/oractuators 810.

A typical industrial control system contains many control loops,human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenance tools,built using an array of network protocols on layered networkarchitectures. In some cases, multiple control loops are nested and/orcascading, with the set point for one control loop being based onprocess variables determined by another control loop. Supervisory-levelcontrol loops and lower-level control loops typically operatecontinuously over the duration of a process, with cycle times rangingfrom milliseconds to minutes.

One type of industrial control system that may include many controlloops, human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenancetools is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets, where centralizeddata acquisition is typically as important as control of the system.SCADA systems are used in distribution systems such as, for example,water distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and naturalgas pipelines, electrical utility transmission and distribution systems,and rail and other public transportation systems, among others. SCADAsystems typically integrate data acquisition systems with datatransmission systems and human-machine interface software to provide acentralized monitoring and control system for numerous process inputsand outputs. SCADA systems are typically designed to collect fieldinformation, transfer this information to a central computer facility,and to display the information to an operator in a graphic and/ortextual manner. Using this displayed information, the operator may, inreal time, monitor and control an entire system from a central location.In various implementations, control of any individual sub-system,operation, or task can be automatic, or can be performed by manualcommands.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a SCADA system 900, here used fordistributed monitoring and control. This example SCADA system 900includes a primary control center 902 and three field sites 930 a-930 c.A backup control center 904 provides redundancy in case of there is amalfunction at the primary control center 902. The primary controlcenter 902 in this example includes a control server 906—which may alsobe called a SCADA server or a Master Terminal Unit (MTU)—and a localarea network (LAN) 908. The primary control center 902 may also includea human-machine interface station 908, a data historian 910, engineeringworkstations 912, and various network equipment such as printers 914,each connected to the LAN 918.

The control server 906 typically acts as the master of the SCADA system900. The control server 906 typically includes supervisory controlsoftware that controls lower-level control devices, such as RemoteTerminal Units (RTUs) and PLCs, located at the field sites 930 a-930 c.The software may tell the system 900 what and when to monitor, whatparameter ranges are acceptable, and/or what response to initiate whenparameters are outside of acceptable values.

The control server 906 of this example may access Remote Terminal Unitsand/or PLCs at the field sites 930 a-930 c using a communicationsinfrastructure, which may include radio-based communication devices,telephone lines, cables, and/or satellites. In the illustrated example,the control server 906 is connected to a modem 916, which providescommunication with serial-based radio communication 920, such as a radioantenna. Using the radio communication 920, the control server 906 cancommunicate with field sites 930 a-930 b using radiofrequency signals922. Some field sites 930 a-930 b may have radio transceivers forcommunicating back to the control server 906.

A human-machine interface station 908 is typically a combination ofhardware and software that allows human operators to monitor the stateof processes in the SCADA system 900. The human-machine interfacestation 908 may further allow operators to modify control settings tochange a control objective, and/or manually override automatic controloperations, such as in the event of an emergency. The human-machineinterface station 908 may also allow a control engineer or operator toconfigure set points or control algorithms and parameters in acontroller, such as a Remote Terminal Unit or a PLC. The human-machineinterface station 908 may also display process status information,historical information, reports, and other information to operators,administrators, mangers, business partners, and other authorized users.The location, platform, and interface of a human-machine interfacestation 908 may vary. For example, the human-machine interface station908 may be a custom, dedicated platform in the primary control center902, a laptop on a wireless LAN, or a browser on a system connected tothe Internet.

The data historian 910 in this example is a database for logging allprocess information within the SCADA system 900. Information stored inthis database can be accessed to support analysis of the system 900, forexample for statistical process control or enterprise level planning.

The backup control center 904 may include all or most of the samecomponents that are found in the primary control center 902. In somecases, the backup control center 904 may temporarily take over forcomponents at the primary control center 902 that have failed or havebeen taken offline for maintenance. In some cases, the backup controlcenter 904 is configured to take over all operations of the primarycontrol center 902, such as when the primary control center 902experiences a complete failure (e.g., is destroyed in a naturaldisaster).

The primary control center 902 may collect and log information gatheredby the field sites 930 a-930 c and display this information using thehuman-machine interface station 908. The primary control center 902 mayalso generate actions based on detected events. The primary controlcenter 902 may, for example, poll field devices at the field sites 930a-930 c for data at defined intervals (e.g., 5 or 60 seconds), and cansend new set points to a field device as required. In addition topolling and issuing high-level commands, the primary control center 902may also watch for priority interrupts coming from the alarm systems atthe field sites 930 a-930 c.

In this example, the primary control center 902 uses point-to-pointconnections to communication with three field sites 930 a-930 c, usingradio telemetry for two communications with two of the field sites 930a-930 b. In this example, the primary control center 902 uses a widearea network (WAN) 960 to communicate with the third field site 930 c.In other implementations, the primary control center 902 may use othercommunication topologies to communicate with field sites. Othercommunication topologies include rings, stars, meshes, trees, lines orseries, and busses or multi-drops, among others. Standard andproprietary communication protocols may be used to transport informationbetween the primary control center 902 and field sites 930 a-930 c.These protocols may use telemetry techniques such as provided bytelephone lines, cables, fiber optics, and/or radiofrequencytransmissions such as broadcast, microwave, and/or satellitecommunications.

The field sites 930 a-930 c in this example perform local control ofactuators and monitor local sensors. For example, a first field site 930a may include a PLC 932. A PLC is a small industrial computer originallydesigned to perform the logic functions formerly executed by electricalhardware (such as relays, switches, and/or mechanical timers andcounters). PLCs have evolved into controllers capable of controllingcomplex processes, and are used extensively in both SCADA systems anddistributed control systems. Other controllers used at the field levelinclude process controllers and Remote Terminal Units, which may providethe same level of control as a PLC but may be designed for specificcontrol applications. In SCADA environments, PLCs are often used asfield devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, andconfigurable than special-purpose controllers.

The PLC 932 at a field site, such as the first field site 930 a, maycontrol local actuators 934, 936 and monitor local sensors 938, 940,942. Examples of actuators include valves 934 and pumps 936, amongothers. Examples of sensors include level sensors 938, pressure sensors940, and flow sensors 942, among others. Any of the actuators 934, 936or sensors 938, 940, 942 may be “smart” actuators or sensors, morecommonly called intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Intelligentelectronic devices may include intelligence for acquiring data,communicating with other devices, and performing local processing andcontrol. An intelligent electronic device could combine an analog inputsensor, analog output, low-level control capabilities, a communicationsystem, and/or program memory in one device. The use of intelligentelectronic devices in SCADA systems and distributed control systems mayallow for automatic control at the local level. Intelligent electronicdevices, such as protective relays, may communicate directly with thecontrol server 906. Alternatively or additionally, a local RemoteTerminal Unit may poll intelligent electronic devices to collect data,which it may then pass to the control server 906.

Field sites 930 a-930 c are often equipped with remote access capabilitythat allows field operators to perform remote diagnostics and repairs.For example, the first remote 930 a may include a modem 916 connected tothe PLC 932. A remote access 950 site may be able to, using a dial upconnection, connect to the modem 916. The remote access 950 site mayinclude its own modem 916 for dialing into to the field site 930 a overa telephone line. At the remote access 950 site, an operator may use acomputer 952 connected to the modem 916 to perform diagnostics andrepairs on the first field site 930 a.

The example SCADA system 900 includes a second field site 930 b, whichmay be provisioned in substantially the same way as the first field site930 a, having at least a modem and a PLC or Remote Terminal thatcontrols and monitors some number of actuators and sensors.

The example SCADA system 900 also includes a third field site 930 c thatincludes a network interface card (NIC) 944 for communicating with thesystem's 900 WAN 960. In this example, the third field site 930 cincludes a Remote Terminal Unit 946 that is responsible for controllinglocal actuators 934, 936 and monitoring local sensors 938, 940, 942. ARemote Terminal Unit, also called a remote telemetry unit, is aspecial-purpose data acquisition and control unit typically designed tosupport SCADA remote stations. Remote Terminal Units may be fielddevices equipped with wireless radio interfaces to support remotesituations where wire-based communications are unavailable. In somecases, PLCs are implemented as Remote Terminal Units.

The SCADA system 900 of this example also includes a regional controlcenter 970 and a corporate enterprise network 980. The regional controlcenter 970 may provide a higher level of supervisory control. Theregional control center 970 may include at least a human-machineinterface station 908 and a control server 906 that may have supervisorycontrol over the control server 906 at the primary control center 902.The corporate enterprise network 980 typically has access, through thesystem's 900 WAN 960, to all the control centers 902, 904 and to thefield sites 930 a-930 c. The corporate enterprise network 980 mayinclude a human-machine interface station 908 so that operators canremotely maintain and troubleshoot operations.

Another type of industrial control system is the distributed controlsystem (DCS). Distributed control systems are typically used to controlproduction systems within the same geographic location for industriessuch as oil refineries, water and wastewater management, electric powergeneration plants, chemical manufacturing plants, and pharmaceuticalprocessing facilities, among others. These systems are usually processcontrol or discrete part control systems. Process control systems may beprocesses that run continuously, such as manufacturing processes forfuel or steam flow in a power plant, for petroleum production in arefinery, or for distillation in a chemical plant. Discrete part controlsystems have processes that have distinct processing steps, typicallywith a distinct start and end to each step, such as found in foodmanufacturing, electrical and mechanical parts assembly, and partsmachining. Discrete-based manufacturing industries typically conduct aseries of steps on a single item to create an end product.

A distributed control system typically uses a centralized supervisorycontrol loop to mediate a group of localized controllers that share theoverall tasks of carrying out an entire production process. Bymodularizing the production system, a distributed control system mayreduce the impact of a single fault on the overall system. A distributedcontrol system is typically interfaced with a corporate network to givebusiness operations a view of the production process.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a distributed control system 1000.This example distributed control system 1000 encompasses a productionfacility, including bottom-level production processes at a field level1004, supervisory control systems at a supervisory level 1002, and acorporate or enterprise layer.

At the supervisory level 1002, a control server 1006, operating as asupervisory controller, may communicate with subordinate systems via acontrol network 1018. The control server 1006 may send set points todistributed field controllers, and may request data from the distributedfield controllers. The supervisory level 1002 may include multiplecontrol servers 1006, with one acting as the primary control server andthe rest acting as redundant, back-up control servers. The supervisorylevel 1002 may also include a main human-machine interface 1008 for useby operators and engineers, a data historian 1010 for logging processinformation from the system 1000, and engineering workstations 1012.

At the field level 1004, the system 1000 may include various distributedfield controllers. In the illustrated example, the distributed controlsystem 1000 includes a machine controller 1020, a PLC 1032, a processcontroller 1040, and a single loop controller 1044. The distributedfield controllers may each control local process actuators, based oncontrol server 1006 commands and sensor feedback from local processsensors.

In this example, the machine controller 1020 drives a motion controlnetwork 1026. Using the motion control network 1026, the machinecontroller 1020 may control a number of servo drives 1022, which mayeach drive a motor. The machine controller 1020 may also drive a logiccontrol bus 1028 to communicate with various devices 1024. For example,the machine controller 1020 may use the logic control bus 1028 tocommunicate with pressure sensors, pressure regulators, and/or solenoidvalves, among other devices. One or more of the devices 1024 may be anintelligent electronic device. A human-machine interface 1008 may beattached to the machine controller 1020 to provide an operator withlocal status information about the processes under control of themachine controller 1020, and/or local control of the machine controller1020. A modem 1016 may also be attached to the machine controller 1020to provide remote access to the machine controller 1020.

The PLC 1032 in this example system 1000 uses a fieldbus 1030 tocommunicate with actuators 1034 and sensors 1036 under its control.These actuators 1034 and sensors 1036 may include, for example, directcurrent (DC) servo drives, alternating current (AC) servo drives, lighttowers, photo eyes, and/or proximity sensors, among others. Ahuman-machine interface 1008 may also be attached to the fieldbus 1030to provide operators with local status and control for the PLC 1032. Amodem 1016 may also be attached to the PLC 1032 to provide remote accessto the PLC 1032.

The process controller 1040 in this example system 1000 also uses afieldbus 1030 to communicate with actuators and sensors under itscontrol, one or more of which may be intelligent electronic devices. Theprocess controller 1040 may communicate with its fieldbus 1030 throughan input/output (I/O) server 1042. An I/O server is a control componenttypically responsible for collecting, buffering, and/or providing accessto process information from control sub-components. An I/O server may beused for interfacing with third-party control components. Actuators andsensors under control of the process controller 1040 may include, forexample, pressure regulators, pressure sensors, temperature sensors,servo valves, and/or solenoid valves, among others. The processcontroller 1040 may be connected to a modem 1016 so that a remote access1050 site may access the process controller 1040. The remote access 1050site may include a computer 1052 for use by an operator to monitor andcontrol the process controller 1040. The computer 1052 may be connectedto a local modem 1016 for dialing in to the modem 1016 connected to theprocess controller 1040.

The illustrated example system 1000 also includes a single loopcontroller 1044. In this example, the single loop controller 1044interfaces with actuators 1034 and sensors 1036 with point-to-pointconnections, instead of a fieldbus. Point-to-point connections require adedicated connection for each actuator 1034 and each sensor 1036.Fieldbus networks, in contrast, do not need point-to-point connectionsbetween a controller and individual field sensors and actuators. In someimplementations, a fieldbus allows greater functionality beyond control,including field device diagnostics. A fieldbus can accomplish controlalgorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing back toa PLC for every control operation. Standard industrial communicationprotocols are often used on control networks and fieldbus networks.

The single loop controller 1044 in this example is also connected to amodem 1016, for remote access to the single loop controller.

In addition to the supervisory level 1002 and field level 1004 controlloops, the distributed control system 1000 may also include intermediatelevels of control. For example, in the case of a distributed controlsystem controlling a discrete part manufacturing facility, there couldbe an intermediate level supervisor for each cell within the plant. Thisintermediate level supervisor could encompass a manufacturing cellcontaining a machine controller that processes a part, and a robotcontroller that handles raw stock and final products. Additionally, thedistributed control system could include several of these cells thatmanage field-level controllers under the main distributed control systemsupervisory control loop.

In various implementations, the distributed control system may include acorporate or enterprise layer, where an enterprise network 1080 mayconnect to the example production facility. The enterprise network 1080may be, for example, located at a corporate office co-located with thefacility, and connected to the control network 1018 in the supervisorylevel 1002. The enterprise network 1080 may provide engineers andmanagers with control and visibility into the facility. The enterprisenetwork 1080 may further include Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)1092, control systems for managing and monitoring work-in-process on afactory floor. An MES can track manufacturing information in real time,receiving up-to-the-minute data from robots, machine monitors andemployees. The enterprise network 1080 may also include ManagementInformation Systems (MIS) 1094, software and hardware applications thatimplement, for example, decision support systems, resource and peoplemanagement applications, project management, and database retrievalapplications, as well as basic business functions such as order entryand accounting. The enterprise network 1080 may further includeEnterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems 1096, business processmanagement software that allows an organization to use a system ofintegrated applications to manage the business and automate many backoffice functions related to technology, services, and human resources.

The enterprise network 1080 may further be connected to a WAN 1060.Through the WAN 1060, the enterprise network 1080 may connect to adistributed plant 1098, which may include control loops and supervisoryfunctions similar to the illustrated facility, but which may be at adifferent geographic location. The WAN 1060 may also connect theenterprise network to the outside world 1090, that is, to the Internetand/or various private and public networks. In some cases, the WAN 1060may itself include the Internet, so that the enterprise network 1080accesses the distributed plant 1098 over the Internet.

As described above, SCADA systems and distributed control systems useProgrammable Logic Controllers (PLCs) as the control components of anoverall hierarchical system. PLCs can provide local management ofprocesses through feedback control, as described above. In a SCADAimplementation, a PLC can provide the same functionality as a RemoteTerminal Unit. When used in a distributed control system, PLCs can beimplemented as local controllers within a supervisory scheme. PLCs canhave user-programmable memory for storing instructions, where theinstructions implement specific functions such as I/O control, logic,timing, counting, proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control,communication, arithmetic, and data and file processing.

FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a PLC 1132 implemented in amanufacturing control process. The PLC 1132 in this example monitors andcontrols various devices over fieldbus network 1130. The PLC 1132 may beconnected to a LAN 1118. An engineering workstation 1112 may also beconnected to the LAN 1118, and may include a programming interface thatprovides access to the PLC 1132. A data historian 1110 on the LAN 1118may store data produced by the PLC 1132.

The PLC 1132 in this example may control a number of devices attached toits fieldbus network 1130. These devices may include actuators, such asa DC servo drive 1122, an AC drive 1124, a variable frequency drive1134, and/or a light tower 1138. The PLC 1132 may also monitor sensorsconnected to the fieldbus network 1130, such as proximity sensors 1136,and/or a photo eye 1142. A human-machine interface 1108 may also beconnected to the fieldbus network 1130, and may provide local monitoringand control of the PLC 1132.

Most industrial control systems were developed years ago, long beforepublic and private networks, desktop computing, or the Internet were acommon part of business operations. These well-established industrialcontrol systems were designed to meet performance, reliability, safety,and flexibility requirements. In most cases, they were physicallyisolated from outside networks and based on proprietary hardware,software, and communication protocols that included basic errordetection and correction capabilities, but lacked secure communicationcapabilities. While there was concern for reliability, maintainability,and availability when addressing statistical performance and failure,the need for cyber security measures within these systems was notanticipated. At the time, security for industrial control systems meanphysically securing access to the network and the consoles thatcontrolled the systems.

Internet-based technologies have since become part of modern industrialcontrol systems. Widely available, low-cost IP devices have replacedproprietary solutions, which increases the possibility of cyber securityvulnerabilities and incidents. Industrial control systems have adoptedInternet-based solutions to promote corporate connectivity and remoteaccess capabilities, and are being designed and implemented usingindustry standard computers, operating systems (OS) and networkprotocols. As a result, these systems may to resemble computer networks.This integration supports new networking capabilities, but provides lessisolation for industrial control systems from the outside world thanpredecessor systems. Networked industrial control systems may be exposedto similar threats as are seen in computer networks, and an increasedlikelihood that an industrial control system can be compromised.

Industrial control system vendors have begun to open up theirproprietary protocols and publish their protocol specifications toenable third-party manufacturers to build compatible accessories.Organizations are also transitioning from proprietary systems to lessexpensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft Windows andUnix-like operating systems as well as common networking protocols suchas TCP/IP to reduce costs and improve performance. Another standardcontributing to this evolution of open systems is Open PlatformCommunications (OPC), a protocol that enables interaction betweencontrol systems and PC-based application programs. The transition tousing these open protocol standards provides economic and technicalbenefits, but also increases the susceptibility of industrial controlsystems to cyber incidents. These standardized protocols andtechnologies have commonly known vulnerabilities, which are susceptibleto sophisticated and effective exploitation tools that are widelyavailable and relatively easy to use.

Industrial control systems and corporate networking systems are ofteninterconnected as a result of several changes in information managementpractices, operational, and business needs. The demand for remote accesshas encouraged many organizations to establish connections to theindustrial control system that enable of industrial control systemsengineers and support personnel to monitor and control the system frompoints outside the control network. Many organizations have also addedconnections between corporate networks and industrial control systemsnetworks to allow the organization's decision makers to obtain access tocritical data about the status of their operational systems and to sendinstructions for the manufacture or distribution of product.

In early implementations this might have been done with customapplications software or via an OPC server/gateway, but, in the past tenyears this has been accomplished with TCP/IP networking and standardizedIP applications like File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Extensible MarkupLanguage (XML) data exchanges. Often, these connections were implementedwithout a full understanding of the corresponding security risks. Inaddition, corporate networks are often connected to strategic partnernetworks and to the Internet. Control systems also make more use of WANsand the Internet to transmit data to their remote or local stations andindividual devices. This integration of control system networks withpublic and corporate networks increases the accessibility of controlsystem vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can expose all levels ofthe industrial control system network architecture to complexity-inducederror, adversaries and a variety of cyber threats, including worms andother malware.

Many industrial control system vendors have delivered systems withdial-up modems that provide remote access to ease the burdens ofmaintenance for the technical field support personnel. Remote access canbe accomplished, for example, using a telephone number, and sometimes anaccess control credential (e.g., valid ID, and/or a password). Remoteaccess may provide support staff with administrative-level access to asystem. Adversaries with war dialers—simple personal computer programsthat dial consecutive phone numbers looking for modems—and passwordcracking software could gain access to systems through these remoteaccess capabilities. Passwords used for remote access are often commonto all implementations of a particular vendor's systems and may have notbeen changed by the end user. These types of connections can leave asystem highly vulnerable because people entering systems throughvendor-installed modems are may be granted high levels of system access.

Organizations often inadvertently leave access links such as dial-upmodems open for remote diagnostics, maintenance, and monitoring. Also,control systems increasingly utilize wireless communications systems,which can be vulnerable. Access links not protected with authenticationand/or encryption have the increased risk of adversaries using theseunsecured connections to access remotely controlled systems. This couldlead to an adversary compromising the integrity of the data in transitas well as the availability of the system, both of which can result inan impact to public and plant safety. Data encryption may be a solution,but may not be the appropriate solution in all cases.

Many of the interconnections between corporate networks and industrialcontrol systems require the integration of systems with differentcommunications standards. The result is often an infrastructure that isengineered to move data successfully between two unique systems. Becauseof the complexity of integrating disparate systems, control engineersoften fail to address the added burden of accounting for security risks.Control engineers may have little training in security and often networksecurity personnel are not involved in security design. As a result,access controls designed to protect control systems from unauthorizedaccess through corporate networks may be minimal. Protocols, such asTCP/IP and others have characteristics that often go unchecked, and thismay counter any security that can be done at the network or theapplication levels.

Public information regarding industrial control system design,maintenance, interconnection, and communication may be readily availableover the Internet to support competition in product choices as well asto enable the use of open standards. Industrial control system vendorsalso sell toolkits to help develop software that implements the variousstandards used in industrial control system environments. There are alsomany former employees, vendors, contractors, and other end users of thesame industrial control system equipment worldwide who have insideknowledge about the operation of control systems and processes.

Information and resources are available to potential adversaries andintruders of all calibers around the world. With the availableinformation, it is quite possible for an individual with very littleknowledge of control systems to gain unauthorized access to a controlsystem with the use of automated attack and data mining tools and afactory-set default password. Many times, these default passwords arenever changed.

IV. Cyber Vaccines and Antibodies

In various implementations, the systems and methods discussed above canbe used to implement cyber vaccines and antibodies.

Malware programs often avoid re-infecting a system twice, and so usevarious markers, such as files, processes, registry entries, and otherdata to identify systems the malware program has already infected. Invarious implementations, a cyber-vaccine technique includes determininga marker generated by the malware program, and using the marker toprevent other network devices from becoming infected by the same malwareprogram.

Malware programs can sometimes alternatively or additionally establish“command and control” communication channels with entities outside of asite network. Using a command and control channel the malware canreceive instructions and/or send valuable data to the outside entity.Cyber-antibody techniques can be used to identify network traffic sentusing this communication channel. Once identified, this seeminglyharmless network traffic can be deliberately “tainted” or made to carrya known malware signature so that the network traffic is blocked by asite network's security perimeter. The taint can be put on any networkdevice, which can protect the network device from also establishingcommunications with the outside entity.

Malware programs can sometimes also detect whether the malware programis executing within a sandbox testing environment. For example, amalware program may look for the presence of particular processes orfiles. A generic cyber-vaccine can replicate the characteristics of atesting environment on production systems, such that productionssystems—which would not be used for analyzing malware—resemble a testingenvironment. Malware programs designed not to trigger in a testingenvironment may thus not trigger on computing systems that have thegeneric cyber-vaccine. In this way, these computing systems can beprotected from infection by malware programs that are capable ofdetecting their environment.

FIGS. 12A-12C illustrate an example of a network 1200, in which cybervaccination techniques can be implemented. The example network 1200includes a number of nodes 1210 a-1210 f, 1280, connected to a number ofnetwork infrastructure devices 1214 a, 1214 b. The example network 1200further includes a network security infrastructure 1230, and a gatewaydevice 1220, through which the network 1200 can connect to othernetworks, including the Internet 1250.

The network nodes 1210 a-1210 f, 1280 can include a variety of devices.For example, the network nodes 1210 a-1210 f, 1280 can include computingsystems, such as server computers, laptop computers, desktop computers,smart phones, personal digital assistants, tablet computers, and so on.As another example, the network nodes 1210 a-1210 f, 1280 can includeperipheral devices, such as printers and monitors, among others. Asanother example, the network nodes 1210 a-1210 f, 1280 can includestorage arrays and compute farms, among other things. As anotherexample, the network nodes 1210 a-1210 f, 1280 can include other systemsthat can be connected to a network, such as entertainment systems,televisions, home appliances, factory machinery, and so on.

The network infrastructure devices 1214 a, 1214 b include devices thatprovide network connectivity. For example, the network infrastructuredevices 1214 a, 1214 b can include routers, switches, hubs, repeaters,access points, and network monitors, among other things. The gatewaydevice 1220 is another example of a network infrastructure device.Examples of gateway devices include modems, access points, and devicesthat combine modem functionality with routing or switchingfunctionality.

The network security infrastructure 1230 includes hardware and softwarethat defends the network 1200 from internal and/or external threats. Forexample, the network security infrastructure 1230 can include anti-virustools, email filtering tools, firewalls, security information and eventmanagement (SIEM) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), intrusionprevention systems (IPSs), and so on. In some implementations, thegateway device 1220 can alternatively or additionally include afirewall, or similar security tool. In many cases, the nodes 1210 a-1210f, 1280 in the network 1200 also includes network security tools, suchas virus scanners and email filters. Frequently, however, a network alsoincludes network security measures at the “perimeter” of the network;that is, where the network connects to other networks, particularlypublic networks such as the Internet 1250.

In the example illustrated by FIG. 12A, a node 1280 has become infectedwith a malware program 1290. In various implementations, the node 1280can include network security tools that can detect that the node 1280has become infected. For example, scans by anti-virus tools and/or hostintrusion detection systems can detect the presence of a virus or wormor similar malware. As another example, real-time system monitors maydetect abnormal activity, such as parts of the file system becominginaccessible due to ransomware encrypting files or other malwarecorrupting files. As another example, system monitors can detectunusually high activity, such as excessive processor or memory usage byan unknown or untrusted process. As another example, automated tools canexamine event logs generated by the node's 1280 operating system and anyapplications running on the node 1280.

Once the node 1280 has determined that it has become infected with themalware program 1290, in various implementations the node 1280 canexecute processes to identify a marker generated by the malware program1290. Some malware avoids infecting the same computing system more thanonce. For example, ransomware can operate by encrypting the data on acomputing system, which the distributor of the ransomware will unencryptupon being paid a ransom. Should the computing system be infectedtwice—such that the already encrypted data is encrypted again—thecomputing system's data may be unrecoverable, rendering the ransomrequest moot.

Malware such as ransomware may thus leave a marker on a computingsystem, which the malware can use to identify a system that the malwarehas already infected. The marker can take various forms. For example, amarker can be an entry placed in a system registry (e.g., a Windows®registry) or a similar database, one or more files or directories placedin the file system, a process running at the application or kernellevel, a user account activated on the system, data placed in systemmemory, and/or an open network port that was not previously open. Insome cases, the marker is static, while in other cases the markertemporary; for example, the marker may expire and disappear naturally(e.g., a process that terminates), the marker may be self-deleting, themarker may be deleted by the malware program, the marker may be deletedby normal operation of the operating system, and so on.

FIG. 12B illustrates an example of a technique for locating andidentifying a marker 1260 placed on the node 1280 by the malware program1290. In various implementations, the node 1280 may be configured toperiodically produce snapshots 1286. A snapshot can capture the currentstate of the node 1280, including for example processing executing atthe time the snapshot was taken, the contents of system memory at thetime the snapshot was taken, the contents and structure of the filesystem, a configuration of the hardware, the contents of a systemregistry, the status of any user accounts currently active on thesystem, and so on. The node 1280 may be configured to periodicallyproduce snapshots as backups of the node 1280, for performance analysis,and/or for security analysis.

In the illustrated example, a process executing on the node 1280 can usesnapshots 1286 of the system to locate and identify the malwareprogram's 1290 marker 1260. For example, the process can identify a“before” snapshot 1282, that is, a snapshot taken before the malwareprogram 1290 infected the node 1280. The process can further identify an“after” snapshot 1284, that is, a snapshot taken after the malwareinfection started. In various implementations, the after snapshot 1284can be taken when a particular event occurs, such as the when themalware program 1290 completes a task (e.g., encrypting an entire filesystem, sending data to the Internet, copying itself to another system,etc.). In these implementations, Intermediate changes made by themalware program 1290 can be excluded from consideration as the marker.

Once the after snapshot 1284 has been obtained, the process can furthercompare the before snapshot 1282 to the after snapshot 1284, andidentify differences. Many of the differences can be legitimate and canbe ignored. For example, processes initiated by trusted operations,files generated by legitimate uses, and/or other creation or removal ofdata that occurs during ordinary operation of the node 1280 can beignored. By process of elimination, the marker 1260 can be located andidentified.

Alternatively or additionally, the marker 1260 can be located by lookingfor unexpected or unknown data, data that cannot be verified, and/ordata that cannot be associated with a valid or trusted process. Forexample, the process executing on the node 1280 can look for unknown orunidentifiable processes, files or directories with unusual names, useraccounts for nonexistent users, changes to memory or files that shouldnot occur, and so on. In some implementations, a set of differencesbetween the before snapshot 1282 and the after snapshot 1284 can beidentified, without determining precisely which of the differences arethe marker 1260. In these implementations, at least one of thesedifferences is assumed to be the marker 1260, and the entire set ofdifferences may be distributed as the marker 1260.

In various implementations, the marker 1260 can be a set of changesobserved in the after snapshot 1284. In these implementations, alladditions and/or modifications to the file system, file system registry,new processes launched, and/or newly created mutex (a program objectthat allows multiple program threads to share a same resource) can,together, be considered the marker 1260. By including all the additionsand/or modifications, the system need not identify precisely whichaddition or modification is being used as the marker. In variousimplementations, the set of changes can be reduced by removing commonoperations, such as may be routinely conducted by the operating system,and/or operations known to be safe. In various implementations, somechanges may not be included in the set, to avoid changes to other nodes1210 a-1210 f that may be undesirable. For example, software uninstalls,termination of processes, loading of certain dynamic link libraries(DLL) may be excluded from the set.

Identification of the marker 1260 generally occurs in real time. “Realtime,” in this context, means that analysis of the snapshots 1286 canoccur in milliseconds, so that the result of the analysis (e.g.,location and identification of the marker) is available virtuallyimmediately. The marker 1260 can thus be determined very quickly afterinfection by the malware program 1290 is detected. As discussed furtherbelow, the marker 1260 further be used to quickly vaccinate othernetwork nodes 1210 a-1210 f against the malware program 1290.

In various implementations, analysis of the malware program 1290 canterminate once the marker 1260 has been identified. In some cases, othernetwork security tools may analyze the malware program 1290, includingfor example to reverse engineer the malware, generate a digitalsignature, determine the behavior of the malware, or to otherwiseconduct a deep analysis of the operation of the malware. While suchanalysis can be useful for preventing future attacks, for purposes ofthe cyber vaccination technique illustrated in FIGS. 12A-12C, thisanalysis is not necessary, and can be bypassed.

Instead, the identified marker 1260 can be used to “vaccinate” the nodes1210 a-1210 f in the network. In medical terms, a vaccine can conferimmunity from a particular disease. FIG. 12C illustrates an examplewhere the marker 1260 generated by the malware program 1290 has beendistributed to each of the un-infected nodes 1210 a-1210 f in thenetwork 1200. Specifically, a process executing on the node 1280 can, assoon as the marker 1260 is identified, distribute a copy of the marker1260 to each of the un-infected nodes 1210 a-1210 f. In variousimplementations, distributing the marker 1260 can be accomplished usingremote administration tools, such as Windows Management Interface,PowerShell, PsTools, and Active Directory Group Policy Objects, amongothers. Alternatively or additionally, the marker 1260 can bedistributed using enterprise endpoint detection and response agents.

In some implementations, the process can identify any nodes 1210 a-1210f in the network 1200 that are to receive the marker 1260. For example,the process can be configured to distribute the marker 1260 specificallyto nodes that have not yet been infected. As another example, a set ofnodes may be designated for receiving the marker 1260, while other nodesare not to receive the marker 1260. In this example, these other nodesmay be particularly secure, particularly sensitive, not configured toaccept the marker 1260, not have the same hardware and/or softwareconfiguration as the infected node 1280, may not be susceptible to thisparticular malware program 1290, or for some other reason will not makeuse of the marker 1260. Alternatively, in some implementations, theprocess may be configured to automatically distribute the marker 1260 toall nodes 1210 a-1210 f in the network 1200. In these implementations,each node 1210 a-1210 f may individually determine what to do with themarker 1260.

In various implementations, when a node 1210 a-1210 f receives a copy ofthe marker 1260, the node 1210 a-1210 f can place the marker 1260 in thesame or similar location as where the marker 1260 was found on theinfected node 1280. For example, the node 1210 a-1210 f can place asimilar entry in a system registry, place a file in a similar directory,launch a similar process, and/or create a similar user account. In caseswhere the marker 1260 is not static the node 1210 a-1210 f canperiodically refresh the marker 1260 (e.g., by restarting the process,recreating a file or user account, etc.).

With the marker 1260 in place on the un-infected nodes 1210 a-1210 f,the nodes 1210 a-1210 f may be immunized from the malware program 1290.For example, should the malware program 1290 migrate from the infectednode 1280 to another node 1210 f, the malware program 1290 may find thatthe second node 1210 f already has the marker 1260. The malware program1290 may thus incorrectly determine that the second node 1210 f wasalready infected by the malware program 1290. Based on thisdetermination, the malware program 1290 may not activate. Thus, eventhough the malware program 1290 managed to spread, the effect of themalware program 1290 may have been prevented. In some cases, when themalware program 1290 does not activate, the malware program 1290potentially also does not spread further. In these cases, the presenceof the marker 1260 on the second node 1210 f had the additional benefitof containing the spread of the malware program 1290.

Distribution of the marker 1260 can also occur in real time. Forexample, automated processes at the node 1280 can activate, once themarker 1260 has been identified, to send copies of the marker 1260 toother nodes 1210 a-1210 f in the network 1200. In some implementations,these automated processes can remotely configure the other nodes 1210a-1210 f to place a copy of the marker 1260 on the nodes 1210 a-1210 f.In some implementations, these automated processes can provide a copy ofthe marker 1260 to each node 1210 a-1210 f, and the nodes 1210 a-1210 fcan include processes for placing a copy of the marker 1260 in theappropriate location. Alternatively, a node 1210 a-1210 f can beconfigured to ignore the marker 1260.

Because the determination and distribution of the marker 1260 can occurin real time, generally, once the node 1280 determines that it hasbecome infected with the malware program 1290, the entire network 1200can be immunized against the malware program 1290 very quickly,potentially faster than the malware program 1290 is able to spreaditself Furthermore, lengthy analysis of the functionality of the malwareprogram 1290 is not needed and can be left for later. Thecyber-vaccination technique, as discussed above, can thus provideprotection against malware infections, including zero-day malware.

FIG. 13 illustrates another example of a network 1300 in which cybervaccination techniques can be implemented. The example network 1300includes a number of nodes 1310 a-1310 f, 1380, connected to a number ofnetwork infrastructure devices 1314 a, 1314 b. The nodes 1310 a-1310 fcan be one of a variety of network devices, such as computing systems,storage arrays, peripheral devices, and so on. The nodes 1310 a-1310 fcan also be a variety of devices capable of being connected to anetwork, such as televisions, home appliances, manufacturing equipment,and so on. The network infrastructure devices 1314 a, 1314 b can includea variety of devices that provide network connectivity, such as routers,switches, hubs, repeaters, access points, and so on. The example network1300 further includes a network security infrastructure 1330, which caninclude various network security tools for defending the network 1300from threats. The example network also includes a gateway 1320, throughwhich the network 1300 can communicate with other networks, includingthe Internet 1350.

In the illustrated example, the network 1300 also includes ahigh-interaction network 1316. The high-interaction network 1316 is aself-contained, carefully monitored environment. The high-interactionnetwork 1316 can include physical and virtual computing systems, whichcan be rapidly reconfigured to emulate all or part of the network 1300,or some other network. In the illustrated example, the high-interactionnetwork 1316 has been configured to include an array of compute servers1370, an array of file servers 1368, and a number of user workstations1376, 1378. The example high-interaction network 1316 further includes aswitch 1374 and a router 1366 that connect the various servers 1368,1370 and workstations 1376, 1378 together. The high-interaction network1316 further includes a firewall 1364, which can serve to make thehigh-interaction network 1316 appear more like a real network. Thehigh-interaction network 1316 further includes a gateway 1362, throughwhich the network emulated within the high-interaction network 1316 cancommunicate with other networks, including the Internet 1350.

In the example of FIG. 13, the node 1380 has become infected with amalware program 1390. In various implementations, the node 1380 caninclude processes that can identify unusual or malicious behavior on thenode 1380, which can indicate the infection by the malware program 1390.For example, the node 1380 can include anti-virus or similar tools. Invarious implementations, once it has been determined that the node 1380has become infected by the malware program 1390, processes running onthe node 1380 can send the malware program 1390 to the high-interactionnetwork 1316 for analysis. Alternatively or additionally, in someimplementations, processes executing on the node 1380 and/or in thenetwork security infrastructure 1330, and/or in the network's 1300infrastructure can isolate the node 1380. In these implementations, anyfurther communication between the node 1380 and the rest of the network1300 or the Internet 1350 can be redirected to the high-interactionnetwork 1316 for analysis.

In some implementations, the malware program 1390, or data associatedwith the malware program 1390, may be identified by the network securityinfrastructure 1330. For example, the network security infrastructure1330 may identify questionable network traffic originating from outsideor inside the network 1300. In some cases, the questionable networktraffic includes known malware. In some cases, the network trafficexhibits behavior and/or data patterns often associated with malwareinfiltrations or attempted infiltrations. In each of these cases, thenetwork security infrastructure 1330 can be configured to redirect thequestionable network traffic to the high-interaction network 1316.

As noted above, the high-interaction network 1316 is isolated from thenetwork 1300. Thus, suspect network traffic, which may include themalware program 1390, can be sent into the high-interaction network1316, and be activated. For example, in the illustrated example, themalware program 1390 has been activated on a user workstation 1378.Because the high-interaction network 1316 is configured to emulate aphysical network, the malware program 1390 can function as designed, anddo whatever what is intended.

As also noted above, the high-interaction network 1316 can closelymonitor the behavior of the malware program 1390. For purposes ofvaccinating the network 1300, however, the high-interaction network 1316can be configured to quickly identify changes made to the userworkstation 1378 by the malware program 1390, and locate a marker 1360generated by the malware program 1390. For example, the high-interactionnetwork 1316 can take a snapshot of the user workstation 1378 before themalware program 1390 is activated and take a snapshot after the malwareprogram 1390 is activated. By comparing these snapshots, thehigh-interaction network 1316 can identify changes made to the userworkstation 1378 by the malware program 1390. Changes such as fileoverwrites (such as, for example, overwrites caused by ransomwareencrypting files), registry overwrites, and other changes related to theharm intended by the malware program 1390 can be ignored. Similarly, insome implementations, deletion of registry entries, changes to sensitiveregistry entries (such as those related to security, backup, restore,and/or anti-virus software), file system deletion or updates ofapplication software such as anti-virus software, changes to operatingsystem directory, loading of certain DLLs, changes to some environmentvariables, and/or new task schedulers may also be excluded.

Once the marker 1360 used by the malware program 1390 has beenidentified, the high-interaction network 1316 can cause the marker 1360to be distributed to the nodes 1310 a-1310 f in the network 1300. Thehigh-interaction network 1316 can be configured with a list ofparticular nodes 1310 a-1310 f that should receive the marker 1360, orthe high-interaction network 1316 can be configured to send the marker1360 to all the nodes 1310 a-1310 f in the network 1300. Thehigh-interaction network 1316 can, for example, use remoteadministration tools to send copies of the marker 1360 to the nodes1310-1310 f in the network 1300. In some implementations, thehigh-interaction network 1316 can place a copy of the marker 1360 in theappropriate location on a node 1310 a-1310 f. In some implementations,the high-interaction network 1316 can provide a copy of the marker 1360to a node 1310 a-1310 f, and the node 1310-1310 f can itself determinewhat to do with the marker 1360.

Once the marker 1360 has been distributed across the network 1300,should the malware program 1390 spread to another node 1310 f, orinfiltrate the network 1300 again, each of the nodes 1310 a-1310 f thathave a copy of the marker 1360 may be immunized form the malware program1390. For example, should the malware program 1390 migrate to aparticular node 1310 f, the malware program 1390 may find the marker1360, and determine not to activate.

Generally, identification and distribution of the marker 1360 occursautomatically and in real-time. For example, the high-interactionnetwork 1316 can be configured to automatically trigger the malwareprogram 1390. The high-interaction network 1316 can furtherautomatically execute steps that can identify the marker 1360, andautomatically distribute the marker 1360 once the marker 1360 has beenidentified. Because each of these processes is automated, vaccination ofthe network 1300 against the malware program 1390 can occur rapidlyafter the malware program 1390 has been triggered.

In various implementations, the high-interaction network 1316 need onlyto conduct sufficient analysis to identify the marker 1360. In somecases, the high-interaction network 1316 can conduct further analysisinto the malware program 1390. In these cases, the high-interactionnetwork 1316 can generate a digital signature for the malware program1390, and/or various indicators that can be used to identify the malwareprogram 1390.

FIGS. 14A-14C illustrate an example of a network 1400, in which cyberantibody techniques can be implemented. The example network 1400includes a number of nodes 1410 a-1410 f, 1480, connected to a number ofnetwork infrastructure devices 1414 a, 1414 b. The nodes 1410 a-1410 fcan be one of a variety of network devices, such as computing systems,storage arrays, peripheral devices, and so on. The nodes 1410 a-1410 fcan also be a variety of devices capable of being connected to anetwork, such as televisions, home appliances, manufacturing equipment,and so on. the network infrastructure devices 1414 a, 1414 b can includea variety of devices that provide network connectivity, such as routers,switches, hubs, repeaters, access points, and so on. The example network1400 further includes a network security infrastructure 1430, which caninclude various network security tools for defending the network 1400from threats. The example network also includes a gateway 1420, throughwhich the network 1400 can communicate with other networks, includingthe Internet 1450.

In the example of FIG. 14A, a node 1480 has become infected with amalware program 1490. In various implementations, the node 1480 caninclude network security tools that can detect that the node 1480 hasbecome infected. For example, routine scans by anti-virus tools candetect the presence of a virus or worm or similar malware. As anotherexample, real-time system monitors may detect abnormal activity, such asparts of the file system becoming inaccessible due to ransomwareencrypting files or other malware corrupting files. As another example,system monitors can detect unusually high activity, such as excessiveprocessor or memory usage by an unknown or untrusted process.

Once the node 1480 has determined that it has become infected with themalware program 1490, in various implementations the node 1480 canexecute processes to identify network packets 1492 sent by the malwareprogram 1490. Some malware programs establish a communication channelwith the computer systems of an outside entity, which will be referredto herein as a malicious actor 1440. The malicious actor 1440 may belocated somewhere on the Internet 1450. In some cases, the maliciousactor 1440 may be within the network 1400. For example, the maliciousactor 1440 may be using a compromised node in the network 1400. Themalware program 1490 may use the communication channel, for example, toreceive instructions or commands from the malicious actor 1440, or otherdata such as security keys or malicious programs. As another example,the malware program 1490 may be sending status updates to the maliciousactor 1440; for example, a ransomware program may communicate apercentage of the node's 1480 file system that has been encrypted. Asanother example, the malware program 1490 may be providing informationto the malicious actor 1440, such as authentication information thatopens a backdoor. As another example, the malware program 1490 may bestealing data (e.g., passwords, credit card numbers, etc.) from thenetwork 1400, and sending this data to the malicious actor 1440.

In some cases, blocking the malware program's 1490 communication channelcan be accomplished by identifying the destination address or targetdomain to which the malware program 1490 is sending packets 1492. Insome cases, however, the packets 1492 from the malware program 1490 mayaddressed to legitimate domains or addresses. For example, the packets1492 may take the form of posts to social media sites, such as Facebook®or Twitter®. As another example, the packets 1492 may include posts topublic forums such as Quora® or Yahoo Answers. In these cases, themalicious actor 1440 can obtain the information contained in the packets1492 by monitoring these sites in a legitimate fashion, using validaccounts. In these examples, blocking all network traffic from thenetwork 1400 to these sites can block legitimate traffic, in addition tothe packets 1492 sent by the malware program 1490.

In other cases, the malware program 1490 may communicate with themalicious actor 1440 through convoluted paths. For example, themalicious actor 1440 may be using proxies, “onion” routers, multi-stageexfiltration, and so on. As another example, the malware program 1490may be communicating with a changing list of destinations, each of whichmay disappear as soon as the packets 1492 are received. In these cases,blocking network traffic from the network 1400 to any one destinationmay not be sufficient.

In various implementations, a cyber antibody technique can be used toblock the packets 1492 from the malware program 1490 without needing toblock particular destination addresses or whole domains. A cyberantibody technique includes identifying packets sent by the malwareprogram 1490, and then “tainting” or modifying these packets 1492 sothat the packets 1492 are blocked by the network security infrastructure1430.

FIG. 14B illustrates an example of the first stage of the cyber antibodytechnique. In the illustrated example, processes running on the node1480 can monitor the packet stream 1482 originating from the node 1480.The processes can further identify the packets 1492 associated with themalware program 1490. Specifically, each process on the node 1480 thatgenerates packets can be monitored, and packets from any known, trusted,or verifiable process can be ignored. In some implementations, HypertextTransfer Protocol (HTTP) requests to retrieve data (e.g., GET requests)may also be ignored. Packets from any unknown, untrusted, orunverifiable processes, or any process that can be identified aspossibly associated with the malware program 1490 can be identified assuspect packets. For example, HTTP requests to send data to a website(e.g., POST requests) can be suspect. For example, HTTP POST request canbe used to exfiltrate data out of the network 1400. As another example,Domain Name Server (DNS) requests can be used to create illicit DNStunnels by attaching special characteristics to DNS requests. In someimplementations, all of the suspect packets are assumed to be packetsthat should be blocked. In some implementations, the suspect packets canbe further filtered to identify the specific packets that areoriginating from the malware program 1490.

Once the packets 1492 to be blocked have been identified, processesrunning on the node 1480 can further determine identifyingcharacteristics for the packets 1492. Characteristics of the packets1492 can include, for example, a process that generated the packets1492. As another example, characteristics can include fields in a headerportion of the packets, such as for example a source address, adestination address, a network protocol type, an identification, and/ora label. As another example, characteristics can include data found in apayload portion of the packets 1492, such as hashtags, random characterstrings, formatted character strings, text formatted using foreigncharacter encodings, and so on. In some cases, text such as hashtagsand/or formatted character strings are used by the malicious actor 1440to locate the packets 1492 once the packets 1492 are on the Internet1450.

The node 1480 can thereafter use the characteristics to identify furtherpackets 1492 from the malware program 1490. These identified packets1492 can then be “tainted.” As illustrated in FIG. 14C, the node 1480can include a tool, process, or filter 1434 through which packets fromthe node 1480 pass before being placed on the network 1400. The filter1434 can identify packets 1492 from the malware program 1490, and“taint” these packets 1492 by inserted data associated with a knownmalware program 1494 into the packets 1492. The data can be, forexample, an executable file, an image, a document, or some other datathat has previously been identified as containing malware or beinggenerated by malware. For example HTTP POST requests can be modified toinclude strings known to be used to exfiltrate data. As another example,DNS packets, including DNS text messages, Extensions mechanisms for DNS(EDNS) messages, and long DNS requests, can be modified withcharacteristics known to be used for DNS tunneling.

By inserting data associated with the known malware program 1494 intothe packets 1492, the packets 1492 will be blocked by network trafficscanning tools 1432 that are part of the network security infrastructure1430. Network traffic scanning tools 1432, such as firewalls, intrusiondetection systems, intrusion protection systems, data loss prevention(DLP) systems, egress filtering, and others can scan outbound networktraffic and block any network traffic that should not be leaving thenetwork 1400. Such traffic can include any packets that containidentifiable malware. By tainting outbound network traffic withcharacteristics of known malware, the network security infrastructure's1430 existing rules and filters can be used to block such traffic. Newrules for the unknown malware program 1490 need not be generated.

The network traffic scanning tools 1432 can thus block packets 1492 thathave been generated by the malware program 1490 when the packets 1492have been modified to include data associated with a known malwareprogram 1494. Modifying the packets 1492 can cause packets that wouldotherwise appear legitimate, such as posts to social media sites orforums, to appear infected. The packets 1492 are selectively modified,however, so that packets 1412 generated for legitimate purposes (e.g.,by users posting to social media sites or forums) are not blocked, andcan pass through the network security infrastructure 1430.

In various implementations, processes executing on the node 1480 canalso distribute the characteristics that identify the packets 1492 fromthe malware program 1490 to other nodes 1410 a-1410 f in the network1400. For example, the process can, using remote administration tools,copy the characteristics to the other nodes 1410 a-1410 f.

The other nodes 1410 a-1401 f can also include a tool, process, orfilter 1434 that can use the characteristics to identify and taintpackets 1492 generated by the malware program 1490, so that thesepackets 1492 will be blocked by the network security infrastructure1430. In some implementations, the processes on the node 1480 canconfigure the filters 1434 at the other nodes 1410 a-1410 f using, forexample, remote administration tools. In some implementations, theprocesses on the node 1480 can make the characteristics of the packets1492 available to the other nodes 1410 a-1410 f, and the nodes 1410a-1410 f can configure their respective filters 1434, or choose not touse the characteristics.

Alternatively or additionally, the process can infect the other nodes1410 a-1410 f with the malware program 1490, so that the other nodes1410 a-1410 f can generate packets that have the same characteristics.For example, the process can copy the malware program 1490 to the othernodes 1410 a-1410 f and cause the malware program 1490 to be launched.Alternatively or additionally, the process can enable paths to the othernodes 1410 a-1410 f that are often used by malware programs todistribute themselves. For example, some malware spreads using the filesystem paths that lead to other devices. Thus, the process can createfile system paths, such as Server Message Block (SMB) shareddirectories, soft links (e.g., “shortcuts”), hard links, etc., betweenthe infected node 1480 and the other nodes 1410 a-1410 f. Alternativelyor additionally, some malware spreads emailing itself to email addressesfound in an address book or contacts list. Thus, the process cangenerate email addresses for the other nodes 1410 a-1410 f, so that,when email is sent to these email addresses, the email will be directedto the other nodes 1410 a-1410 f.

The identification of the packets 1492 generated by the malware program1490 and determination of identifying characteristics of these packets1492 can occur in real time. Thus, the communication channel to themalicious actor 1440 can be blocked very quickly once the node 1480 hasbecome infected. Additionally, distribution of the identifyingcharacteristics can also occur in real time, so that other nodes 1410a-1410 f in the network 1400 can also block similar communicationchannels, should the malware program 1490 spread to these other nodes1410 a-1410 f. Deeper analysis of the packets 1492, such as theirintended purpose, destination, contents, method of operation, and so onis not needed, and can be left for later. Deeper analysis of the malwareprogram 1490, to determine, for example, the source of the malwareprogram 1490, its intended purpose, and the nature of the harm themalware program 1490 is capable of, can also be left for later.Immediate isolation of the infected node 1480, while prudent, can alsobe left for later. The node 1480 can, however, in some implementations,issue alerts to network administrators to indicate the presence of themalware program 1490 and the need for action to be taken.

FIG. 15 illustrates another example of a network 1500 in which cyberantibody techniques can be implemented. The example network 1500includes a number of nodes 1510 a-1510 f, 1580, connected to a number ofnetwork infrastructure devices 1514 a, 1514 b. The nodes 1510 a-1510 fcan be one of a variety of network devices, such as computing systems,storage arrays, peripheral devices, and so on. The nodes 1510 a-1510 fcan also be a variety of devices capable of being connected to anetwork, such as televisions, home appliances, manufacturing equipment,and so on. The network infrastructure devices 1514 a, 1514 b can includea variety of devices that provide network connectivity, such as routers,switches, hubs, repeaters, access points, and so on. The example network1500 further includes a network security infrastructure 1530, which caninclude various network security tools for defending the network 1500from threats. The example network also includes a gateway 1520, throughwhich the network 1500 can communicate with other networks, includingthe Internet 1550.

In the illustrated example, the network 1500 also includes ahigh-interaction network 1516. The high-interaction network 1516 is aself-contained, carefully monitored environment, in which malwareprograms can be released, monitored, and studied. In the illustratedexample, the high-interaction network 1516 has been configured toinclude an array of compute servers 1570, an array of file servers 1568,and a number of user workstations 1576, 1578. The examplehigh-interaction network 1516 further includes a switch 1574 and arouter 1566 that connect the various servers 1568, 1570 and workstations1576, 1578 together. The high-interaction network 1516 further includesa firewall 1564, which can serve to make the high-interaction network1516 appear more like a real network. The high-interaction network 1516further includes a gateway 1562, through which the network emulatedwithin the high-interaction network 1516 can communicate with othernetworks, including the Internet 1550.

In the example of FIG. 15, the node 1580 has become infected with amalware program 1590. In various implementations, the node 1580 caninclude processes that can identify unusual or malicious behavior on thenode 1580, which can indicate the infection by the malware program 1590.For example, the node 1580 can include anti-virus or similar tools. Invarious implementations, once it has been determined that the node 1580has become infected by the malware program 1590, processes running onthe node 1580 can send the malware program 1590 to the high-interactionnetwork 1516 for analysis. Alternatively or additionally, in someimplementations, processes executing on the node 1580 and/or in thenetwork security infrastructure 1530, and/or in the network's 1500infrastructure can isolate the node 1580. In these implementations, anyfurther communication between the node 1580 and the rest of the network1500 or the Internet 1550 can be redirected to the high-interactionnetwork 1516 for analysis.

In some implementations, the malware program 1590, or data associatedwith the malware program 1590, may be identified by the network securityinfrastructure 1530. For example, the network security infrastructure1530 may identify questionable network traffic originating from outsideor inside the network 1500. In some cases, the questionable networktraffic includes known malware. In some cases, the network trafficexhibits behavior and/or data patterns often associated with malwareinfiltrations or attempted infiltrations. In each of these cases, thenetwork security infrastructure 1530 can be configured redirect thequestionable network traffic to the high-interaction network 1516.

As noted above, the high-interaction network 1516 is isolated from thenetwork 1500. Thus, suspect network traffic, which may include themalware program 1590, can be sent into the high-interaction network1516, and be activated. For example, in the illustrated example, themalware program 1590 has been activated on a user workstation 1578.Because the high-interaction network 1516 is configured to emulate aphysical network, the malware program 1590 can function as designed, anddo whatever harm is intended.

As also noted above, the high-interaction network 1516 can closelymonitor the behavior of the malware program 1590, including watching forpackets 1592 that are transmitted by the malware program 1590. Forexample, the high-interaction network 1516 can isolate processesassociated with or spawned by the malware program 1590, and identify anypackets 1592 that are generated by these processes. The high-interactionnetwork 1516 can further determine characteristics of these packets 1592that distinguish these packets 1592 from other packets in a packetstream 1582 leaving the high-interaction network 1516.

Because the high-interaction network 1516 is isolated from the rest ofthe network 1500, the packets 1592 can be allowed to reach a maliciousactor 1540 located somewhere on the Internet 1550, so that the behaviorof the packets 1592 and the malware program 1590 can be furtheranalyzed.

For purposes of the cyber antibody technique, however, this furtheranalysis is not needed, and can be left for later. Once the packets 1592have been identified, the distinguishing characteristics of thesepackets 1592 can be distributed to the nodes 1510 a-1510 f in thenetwork 1500. The characteristics can further be used to configuretools, processes, or filters 1534 that can use the characteristics totaint or modify packets that have similar characteristics. In someimplementations, the high-interaction network 1516 can remotelyconfigure the filters 1534 using, for example, remote administrationtools. In some implementations, the high-interaction network 1516 canprovide the characteristics to the nodes 1510 a-1510 f, which can thenuse the characteristics to configure the filters 1534.

Distributing the characteristics can lead to the communication channelbetween the malware program 1590 and the malicious actor 1540 to be cutoff, even if the malware program 1590 manages to spread to other nodes1510 a-1510 f in the network 1500. The operating of the malware program1590 may thus be halted or at least contained.

Generally, analysis and identification of the packets 1592 from themalware program 1590 occurs automatically and in real time. For example,the high-interaction network 1516 can be configured to automaticallytrigger the malware program 1590. The high-interaction network 1516 canfurther automatically execute the steps to identify the packets 1592,and automatically distribute distinguishing characteristics of thesepackets across the network 1500. Because each of these processes isautomated, preemptive blocking of the malware program 1590 communicationchannel can occur rapidly after the malware program has been triggered.

FIG. 16 illustrates an example of a network 1600 that includes a sandboxtesting environment 1680. The example network 1600 includes a number ofnodes 1610 a-1610 g, connected to a number of network infrastructuredevices 1614 a, 1614 b. The nodes 1610 a-1610 g can be one of a varietyof network devices, such as computing systems, storage arrays,peripheral devices, and so on. The nodes 1610 a-1610 g can also be avariety of devices capable of being connected to a network, such astelevisions, home appliances, manufacturing equipment, and so on. Thenetwork infrastructure devices 1614 a, 1614 b can include a variety ofdevices that provide network connectivity, such as routers, switches,hubs, repeaters, access points, and so on. The example network 1600further includes a network security infrastructure 1630, which caninclude various network security tools for defending the network 1600from threats. The example network also includes a gateway 1620, throughwhich the network 1600 can communicate with other networks, includingthe Internet 1650.

The example network 1600 further includes an example of sandbox testingenvironment 1680. The sandbox testing environment 1680 is a closedsystem in which a malware program 1690 can be tested and analyzed. Atypical sandbox testing environment 1680 includes one or more servers1682 a, 1682 b, each executing a number of virtual machines 1684 a-1684d, 1686 a-1686 d. The virtual machines 1684 a-1684 d, 1686 a-1686 d canbe configured to resemble production network devices, such as the nodes1610 a-1610 g. Suspect data 1692, identified by the network securityinfrastructure 1630, can be sent to the sandbox testing environment 1680for analysis. Often, the sandbox testing environment does not include anoutbound communication channel 1694, to prevent any effects from malwarethat is being tested from spreading.

Virtual machines are often used in sandbox testing because virtualmachines can be brought up, reconfigured, and/or shut down very quickly.Additionally, because virtual machines exist only in the memory of ahost server, the operation of a virtual machine—particularly theoperation of a malware program—can be closely monitored. Sandbox testingenvironments are often used for detailed analysis of malware programs.

Some malware programs, however, have been designed to detect that themalware program is within a sandbox testing environment. Such malwareprograms can avoid activating when in a sandbox testing environment, andthus thwart detection and/or analysis. Such malware programs canidentify the sandbox testing environment by, for example, looking for aMedia Access Control (MAC) address, which can uniquely identify anetwork interface. A MAC address typically includes an organizationallyunique identifier, which can identify a manufacturer of the networkinterface. In a virtual machine, the organizationally unique identifiermay identify the producer of the hypervisor, such as VMWare® or Xen®.This information can indicate to a malware program 1690 that the malwareprogram 1690 has been released within a virtual machine.

The malware program 1690 can alternatively or additionally look forother indicators that identify the sandbox testing environment 1680. Forexample, the malware program 1690 can look for entries in a systemregistry that are associated with hypervisors or the sandbox testingenvironment 1680. As another example, the malware program 1690 can lookfor processes associated with virtual machines (e.g., processes runningas part of the hypervisor) and/or with the sandbox testing environment1680. As another example, the malware program 1690 can look for files,directories, tools, and other data associated with a hypervisor orsandbox testing environment 1680. As another example, the malwareprogram 1690 can look at a current execution path, which may indicatethat the malware program 1690 is in a virtual machine and/or in thesandbox testing environment 1680.

In some cases, the malware program 1690 can further thwart analysis inthe sandbox testing environment 1680 by activating only with certaintriggers. The trigger can be a timer. For example, often sandbox testingspends only a few minutes attempting to analyze a suspicious file beforemoving on. In this way, the sandbox testing environment 1680 can testmany suspect files, in an attempt to keep up with the rate of attacks.Thus, some malware may trigger after a lapse of more than a few minutes,or after a full day, or after some other time period. As anotherexample, some malware triggers based on events that usually do not occurin a sandbox testing environment, such as a system reboot or userinteraction.

FIG. 17 illustrates an example of a generic cyber vaccination technique,in which a malware program's 1790 anti-detection efforts can be usedagainst it. The example network 1700 includes a number of nodes 1710a-1710 g, connected to a number of network infrastructure devices 1714a, 1714 b. The nodes 1710 a-1710 g can be one of a variety of networkdevices, such as computing systems, storage arrays, peripheral devices,and so on. The nodes 1710 a-1710 g can also be a variety of devicescapable of being connected to a network, such as televisions, homeappliances, manufacturing equipment, and so on. The networkinfrastructure devices 1714 a, 1714 b can include a variety of devicesthat provide network connectivity, such as routers, switches, hubs,repeaters, access points, and so on. The example network 1700 furtherincludes a network security infrastructure 1730, which can includevarious network security tools for defending the network 1700 fromthreats. The example network also includes a gateway 1720, through whichthe network 1700 can communicate with other networks, including theInternet 1750.

The nodes 1710 a-1710 g, in the example of FIG. 17, are productionnetwork devices. That is, the nodes 1710 a-1710 g are used for thenormal network operations, or for whatever operations the owner of thenetwork 1700 intends to use the network 1700. Generally, normal networkoperations exclude testing and analyzing malware, given malware'sability to damage computing systems and/or spread across a network anddo further harm.

As discussed above, a sandbox testing environment 1780 can include oneor more servers 1782 a, 1782 b that each can be executing a number ofvirtual machines 1784 a-1784 d, 1786 a-1786 d. The virtual machines 1784a-1784 d, 1786 a-1786 d can be configured for identifying and analyzingmalware programs.

In various implementations, the sandbox testing environment 1780 canalso be used to determine characteristics that identify the operatingenvironment of the virtual machines 1784 a-1784 d, 1786 a-1786 d asassociated with the sandbox testing environment 1780. Suchcharacteristics include, for example, processes associated with virtualmachines, particular MAC addresses, particular entries in a systemregistry, the structure and/or contents of the file systems on thevirtual machines 1784 a-1784 d, 1786 a-1786 d, and/or a particularpattern of behavior of the virtual machines 1784 a-1784 d, 1786 a-1786d. In some implementations, determination of these characteristics canbe conducted by another network device and/or by the network securityinfrastructure 1730.

These characteristics that can identify an operating environment asbeing inside the sandbox testing environment 1780 can be used toimmunize the nodes 1710 a-1710 g in the network 1700 from malware thatis designed not to activate when in a sandbox. For example, virtualmachines 1760 a-1760 g can be started on each of the nodes 1710 a-1710g, and the normal operation of the nodes 1710 a-1710 g can be conductedwithin the virtual machines 1760 a-1760 g. As another example, insteadof running virtual machines on each node 1710 a-1710 g, processesassociated with virtual machines can be started on the nodes 1710 a-1710g. As another example, files, directories, system registry entries,and/or other data found in the sandbox testing environment 1780 can bereplicated on the nodes 1710 a-1710 g.

Once the nodes 1710 a-1710 g have been made to resemble the sandboxtesting environment 1780, the nodes 1710 a-1710 g can be protected fromcertain kinds of malware attacks. For example, a malware program 1790may find its way onto one of the nodes 1710 g. The malware program,however, may erroneous determine that the node 1710 g is in a sandbox,and thus—in an attempt to avoid detection—not activate.

In various implementations, the techniques discussed above, includingcyber vaccination against specific malware, cyber antibody techniquesthat block a malware program's communication channel, and a genericcyber vaccination scheme, can be used in various combinations, toprovide multiple, immediate defenses against malware attacks.Additionally, each technique can be used in combination with existingnetwork security techniques and tools.

Specific details were given in the preceding description to provide athorough understanding of various implementations of systems andcomponents for cyber vaccines and antibodies. It will be understood byone of ordinary skill in the art, however, that the implementationsdescribed above may be practiced without these specific details. Forexample, circuits, systems, networks, processes, and other componentsmay be shown as components in block diagram form in order not to obscurethe embodiments in unnecessary detail. In other instances, well-knowncircuits, processes, algorithms, structures, and techniques may be shownwithout unnecessary detail in order to avoid obscuring the embodiments.

It is also noted that individual implementations may be described as aprocess which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a data flowdiagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchartmay describe the operations as a sequential process, many of theoperations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition,the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process is terminatedwhen its operations are completed, but could have additional steps notincluded in a figure. A process may correspond to a method, a function,a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, etc. When a process correspondsto a function, its termination can correspond to a return of thefunction to the calling function or the main function.

The term “computer-readable medium” includes, but is not limited to,portable or non-portable storage devices, optical storage devices, andvarious other mediums capable of storing, containing, or carryinginstruction(s) and/or data. A computer-readable medium may include anon-transitory medium in which data can be stored and that does notinclude carrier waves and/or transitory electronic signals propagatingwirelessly or over wired connections. Examples of a non-transitorymedium may include, but are not limited to, a magnetic disk or tape,optical storage media such as compact disk (CD) or digital versatiledisk (DVD), flash memory, memory or memory devices. A computer-readablemedium may have stored thereon code and/or machine-executableinstructions that may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, aprogram, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class,or any combination of instructions, data structures, or programstatements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or ahardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data,arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments,parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via anysuitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing,network transmission, or the like.

The various examples discussed above may further be implemented byhardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardwaredescription languages, or any combination thereof. When implemented insoftware, firmware, middleware or microcode, the program code or codesegments to perform the necessary tasks (e.g., a computer-programproduct) may be stored in a computer-readable or machine-readablemedium. A processor(s), implemented in an integrated circuit, mayperform the necessary tasks.

Where components are described as being “configured to” perform certainoperations, such configuration can be accomplished, for example, bydesigning electronic circuits or other hardware to perform theoperation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (e.g.,microprocessors, or other suitable electronic circuits) to perform theoperation, or any combination thereof.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, andalgorithm steps described in connection with the implementationsdisclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computersoftware, firmware, or combinations thereof. To clearly illustrate thisinterchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrativecomponents, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been describedabove generally in terms of their functionality. Whether suchfunctionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon theparticular application and design constraints imposed on the overallsystem. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality invarying ways for each particular application, but such implementationdecisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from thescope of the present disclosure.

The techniques described herein may also be implemented in electronichardware, computer software, firmware, or any combination thereof. Suchtechniques may be implemented in any of a variety of devices such asgeneral purposes computers, wireless communication device handsets, orintegrated circuit devices having multiple uses including application inwireless communication device handsets and other devices. Any featuresdescribed as modules or components may be implemented together in anintegrated logic device or separately as discrete but interoperablelogic devices. If implemented in software, the techniques may berealized at least in part by a computer-readable data storage mediumcomprising program code including instructions that, when executed,performs one or more of the methods described above. Thecomputer-readable data storage medium may form part of a computerprogram product, which may include packaging materials. Thecomputer-readable medium may comprise memory or data storage media, suchas random access memory (RAM) such as synchronous dynamic random accessmemory (SDRAM), read-only memory (ROM), non-volatile random accessmemory (NVRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory(EEPROM), FLASH memory, magnetic or optical data storage media, and thelike. The techniques additionally, or alternatively, may be realized atleast in part by a computer-readable communication medium that carriesor communicates program code in the form of instructions or datastructures and that can be accessed, read, and/or executed by acomputer, such as propagated signals or waves.

The program code may be executed by a processor, which may include oneor more processors, such as one or more digital signal processors(DSPs), general purpose microprocessors, an application specificintegrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable logic arrays (FPGAs), orother equivalent integrated or discrete logic circuitry. Such aprocessor may be configured to perform any of the techniques describedin this disclosure. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor;but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor,controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also beimplemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combinationof a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one ormore microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other suchconfiguration. Accordingly, the term “processor,” as used herein mayrefer to any of the foregoing structure, any combination of theforegoing structure, or any other structure or apparatus suitable forimplementation of the techniques described herein. In addition, in someaspects, the functionality described herein may be provided withindedicated software modules or hardware modules configured for cybervaccines and antibodies.

As used below, any reference to a series of examples is to be understoodas a reference to each of those examples disjunctively (e.g., “Examples1-4” is to be understood as “Examples 1, 2, 3, or 4”).

Example 1 is a method, where the method comprises determining, by anetwork device infected by a malware program, a marker generated by themalware program. The marker indicates to the malware program that thenetwork device has been infected by the malware program. Determining themarker includes identifying a placement of the marker on the networkdevice. The method further includes identifying one or more othernetwork devices that have not previously been infected by the malwareprogram. The method further includes automatically distributing copiesof the marker. When a copy of the marker is received at an identifiednetwork device from the one or more other network devices, theidentified network device places the marker on the identified networkdevice according to the identified placement.

Example 2 is the method of claim 1, where determining the markerincludes comparing a first snapshot of the network device with a secondsnapshot of the network device. The first snapshot was taken before theinfection by the malware program started, and the second snapshot wastaken at a pre-determined time after the infection started. The methodfurther includes determining one or more differences between the firstsnapshot and the second snapshot.

Example 3 is the method of examples 1-2, where determining the markerincludes determining a change in a system registry of the networkdevice.

Example 4 is the method of examples 1-3, where determining the markerincludes determining a change in a file system of the network device.

Example 5 is the method of examples 1-4, where determining the markerincludes identifying a process running on the network device.

Example 6 is the method of examples 1-5, where determining the markerincludes identifying a user logged in to the network device.

Example 7 is the method of examples 1-6, where determining the markerincludes determining a change in a system memory of the network device.

Example 8 is the method of examples 1-7, where determining the markerincludes identifying an open port of the network device.

Example 9 is the method of examples 1-8, where the method furthercomprises identifying the network device as infected by the malwareprogram.

Example 10 is the method of examples 1-9, where the method furthercomprises activating the malware program on the network device.

Example 11 is the method of examples 1-10, where presence of a copy ofthe marker on a network device from the one or more other networkdevices represents the network device as infected by the malwareprogram.

Example 12 is the method of examples 1-11, where determining the markeroccurs in real time.

Example 13 is the method of examples 1-12, where automaticallydistributing the copies of the marker includes using a remoteadministration tool.

Example 14 is a network device, which includes one or more processorsand a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The non-transitorycompute readable medium includes instructions that, when executed by theone or more processors, cause the one or more processors to performoperations according to the method(s) of examples 1-13.

Example 15 is a computer-program product tangibly embodied in anon-transitory machine-readable storage medium, including instructionsthat, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or moreprocessors to perform steps according to the method(s) of examples 1-13.

Example 16 is a method, where the method comprises monitoring, by anetwork device infected with an unknown malware program, one or morepackets sent by the network device onto a network. The method furtherincludes identifying a packet that is associated with the unknownmalware program. The packet is identified from among the monitoredpackets, and identifying the packet includes determining acharacteristic of the packet. The method further includes identifyingone or more other packets having a characteristic similar to thecharacteristic of the packet. The method further includes inserting dataassociated with a known malware program into the one or more otherpackets. The method further includes automatically distributing thecharacteristic of the packet. When the characteristic is received atanother network device, the characteristic is used to identifyadditional packets having a characteristic similar to the characteristicof the packet.

Example 17 is the method of example 16, where identifying the packetassociated with the malware program includes determining a process thatgenerated the packet.

Example 18 is the method of examples 16-17, where determining thecharacteristic of the packet includes examining a header portion of thepacket.

Example 19 is the method of examples 16-18, where examining the headerportion includes identifying one or more of a source address, adestination address. a network service type, an identifier, a class, ora label.

Example 20 is the method of examples 16-19, where determining thecharacteristic of the packet includes examining a payload portion of thepacket.

Example 21 is the method of examples 16-20, where examining the payloadportion includes identifying for a character string.

Example 22 is the method of examples 16-21, where the data associatedwith the known malware program infects the one or more other packetswith the known malware program.

Example 23 is the method of examples 16-22, where the known malwareprogram is blocked by network security infrastructure devices.

Example 24 is the method of examples 16-23, where monitoring the packetsincludes monitoring for minutes, hours, days, or weeks.

Example 25 is the method of examples 16-24, where the method furthercomprises receiving a new characteristic from the network, wherein thenew characteristic is associated with a new malware program. The methodfurther comprises configuring a process with the new characteristic,wherein the process inserts the digital signature in other packets witha similar characteristic.

Example 26 is the method of examples 16-25, where identifying the packetoccurs in real time.

Example 27 is the method of examples 16-26, where automaticallydistributing the characteristic includes using remote administrationtools.

Example 28 is the method of examples 16-27, where automaticallydistributing the characteristic includes generating a file system pathto the other network device.

Example 29 is the method of examples 16-28, where automaticallydistributing the characteristic includes generating an email address. Inthis example, email sent to the email address is sent to the othernetwork device.

Example 30 is the method of examples 16-29, where the network includes anetwork security infrastructure device. The network securityinfrastructure device is configured to block packets that include thedata associated with the known malware program.

Example 31 is a network device, which includes one or more processorsand a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The non-transitorycompute readable medium includes instructions that, when executed by theone or more processors, cause the one or more processors to performoperations according to the method(s) of examples 16-30.

Example 32 is a computer-program product tangibly embodied in anon-transitory machine-readable storage medium, including instructionsthat, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or moreprocessors to perform steps according to the method(s) of examples16-30.

Example 33 is a method, where the method comprises determining, by anetwork device on a network, one or more characteristics of a testingenvironment. The testing environment is used to analyze malwareprograms. The method further includes configuring a production networkdevice used in network operations. The production network device isconfigured using the one or more characteristics. Network operationsexclude analyzing malware programs. Configuring the production networkdevice with the one or more characteristics causes the productionnetwork device to resemble the testing environment.

Example 34 is the method of example 33, where the testing environmentincludes a virtual machine.

Example 35 is the method of examples 33-34, where the one or morecharacteristics include a process associated with a virtual machine.

Example 36 is the method of examples 33-35, where the one or morecharacteristics include a particular Media Access Control (MAC) address.

Example 37 is the method of examples 33-36, where the one or morecharacteristics include an entry in a system registry.

Example 38 is the method of examples 33-37, where the one or morecharacteristics include one or more of a structure or content of a filesystem.

Example 39 is the method of examples 33-38, where the one or morecharacteristics include an execution path of a process associated withthe testing environment.

Example 40 is the method of examples 33-39, where the method furthercomprises automatically distributing the one or more characteristics toone or more other network devices.

Example 41 is the method of examples 33-40, where the method furthercomprises configuring the network device with the one or morecharacteristics.

Example 42 is the method of examples 33-41, where the method furthercomprises receiving a malware program. The malware program is configuredto execute upon determining that the malware program is not in thetesting environment.

1. A method, comprising: determining, by a network security device on anetwork, one or more characteristics of a testing environment, whereinthe testing environment is a closed and monitored computing environmentin which malware programs can be run and analyzed, wherein the testingenvironment prevents the malware programs from infecting other networkdevices, wherein a malware program can use the one or morecharacteristics to identify a target network device as the testingenvironment, and wherein the malware program avoids running on thetarget network device when the malware program determines the targetnetwork device has at least one of the one or more characteristics; andconfiguring a network device on a network with the one or morecharacteristics, wherein the network device is connected to andcommunicates with other network devices, wherein the network device isnot used for analyzing malware programs, and wherein configuring thenetwork device with the one or more characteristics causes the networkdevice to resemble the testing environment.
 2. The method of claim 1,wherein the testing environment includes a virtual machine.
 3. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the one or more characteristics include aprocess associated with a virtual machine.
 4. The method of claim 1,wherein the one or more characteristics include a particular MediaAccess Control (MAC) address.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the oneor more characteristics include an entry in a system registry.
 6. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the one or more characteristics include oneor more of a structure or content of a file system.
 7. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the one or more characteristics include an executionpath of a process associated with the testing environment.
 8. The methodof claim 1, further comprising: automatically distributing the one ormore characteristics to one or more other network devices. 9.-10.(canceled)
 11. A network security device, comprising: one or moreprocessors; and a non-transitory computer-readable medium includinginstructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, causethe one or more processors to perform operations including: determiningone or more characteristics of a testing environment, wherein thetesting environment is a closed and monitored computing environment inwhich malware programs can be run and analyzed, wherein the testingenvironment prevents the malware programs from infecting other networkdevices, wherein a malware program can use the one or morecharacteristics to identify a target network device as a testingenvironment, and wherein the malware program avoids running on thetarget network device when the malware program determines the targetnetwork device has at least one of the one or more characteristics; andconfiguring a network device on a network with the one or morecharacteristics, wherein the network device is connected to andcommunicates with other network devices, wherein the network device isnot used for analyzing malware programs, and wherein configuring thenetwork device with the one or more characteristics causes the networkdevice to resemble the testing environment.
 12. The network device ofclaim 11, wherein the testing environment includes a virtual machine.13. The network device of claim 11, wherein the non-transitorycomputer-readable medium further comprises instructions that, whenexecuted by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processorsto perform operations including: automatically distributing the one ormore characteristics to one or more other network devices. 14.-15.(canceled)
 16. A computer-program product tangibly embodied in anon-transitory machine-readable storage medium, including instructionsthat, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or moreprocessors to: determine one or more characteristics of a testingenvironment, wherein the testing environment is a closed and monitoredcomputing environment in which malware programs can be run and analyzed,wherein the testing environment prevents the malware programs frominfecting other network devices, wherein a malware program can use theone or more characteristics to identify a target network device as atesting environment, and wherein the malware program avoids running onthe target network device when the malware program determines the targetnetwork device has at least one of the one or more characteristics; andconfigure a network device on a network with the one or morecharacteristics, wherein the network device is connected to andcommunicates with other network devices, wherein the network device isnot used for analyzing malware programs, and wherein configuring thenetwork device with the one or more characteristics causes the networkdevice to resemble the testing environment.
 17. The computer-programproduct of claim 16, wherein the testing environment includes a virtualmachine.
 18. The computer-program product of claim 16, furthercomprising instructions that, when executed by the one or moreprocessors, cause the one or more processors to: automaticallydistribute the one or more characteristics to one or more other networkdevices. 19.-20. (canceled)
 21. The method of claim 1, wherein the oneor more characteristics include hardware identifiers, software programs,or data.
 22. The method of claim 1, wherein configuring the networkdevice includes modifying an operation of a program running on thenetwork device.
 23. The method of claim 1, wherein configuring thenetwork device includes starting a virtual device on the network device.24. The computer-program product of claim 16, wherein the one or morecharacteristics include hardware identifiers, software programs, ordata.
 25. The computer-program product of claim 16, wherein configuringthe network device includes modifying an operation of a program runningon the network device.
 26. The computer-program product of claim 16,wherein configuring the network device includes starting a virtualdevice on the network device.